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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL 
Section I. INTRODU~TION 
1-1. Purpose 
a. This manual sets forth doctrine and es-
tablishes procedures for the management, 
planning, and collection of information which, 
upon evaluation and production into intelli-
gence, is reported and disseminated as Army 
technical intelligence. It provides guidance for 
commanders, staff officers, and other personnel 
and units and aids in understanding the con-
cept and role of technical intelligence in the 
overall intelligence requirements of the com-
mander. 
b. Users of this manual are encouraged to 
submit recommendations to improve its clarity 
or accuracy. Comments should be keyed to the 
specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in 
which the change is recommended. Reasons 
should be provided for each comment to insure 
understanding and complete evaluation. Com-
ments should be forwarded direct to the Com-
manding Officer, U.S. Army Combat Develop-
ments Command Intelligence Agency, Fort 
Holabird, Maryland 21219. Originators of pro-
posed changes which would constitute a signif-
icant modification of approved Army doctrine 
may send an information copy, through com-
mand channels, to the Commanding General, 
USACDC, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060, to fa-
cilitate review and follow-up. 
1-2. Scope 
a. The contents of this manual deal primar-
ily with technical intelligence organizations 
and the objectives and functions of technical 
intelligence operations. The manual outlines 
procedures and establishes broad principles re-
garding the role of military intelligence units 
engaged in technical intelligence activities, and 
identifies those sources and agencies available 
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to assist in accomplishing the technical intel-
ligence requirements of the commander. Engi-
neer topographic and terrain intelligence are 
discussed in FM 5-30 and 30-10; they are not 
included within the scope of this manual. 
-
b. The material presented herein is applica-
ble to general war, limited war, and cold war 
situations, to include stability operations; nu-
clear and nonnuclear warfare environments; 
and employment of, and protection from, 
chemical, biological, and radiological agents. 
c. This manual is in consonance with the fol-
lowing International Standardization Agree-
ments which are identified by type of agreement 
and number at the beginning of each appro-
priate chapter in the manual: ST AN AG 2084, 
and SOLOG 94 (Handling and Reporting of 
Captured Enemy Documents and Equipment); 
STANAG 2097 (Nomenclature for Soviet Bloc 
Army Weapons and Equipment). 
1-3. Definitions 
a. For definition of terms used see AR 
320-5. 
b. The relationship of intelligence and tech-
nical intelligence is set forth below: 
(1) Intelligence is the product resulting 
from the collection, evaluation, analysis, inte-
gration, and interpretation of all information 
concerning one or more aspects of foreign 
countries or areas which are immediately or 
potentially significant to the development and 
execution of military plans, policies, operations 
and development of military equipment. Tech-
nical intelligence, which is one aspect of mili-
tary intelligence, plays a vital role in the tacti-
cal and strategic intelligence picture and there-
fore must be considered as part of an overall 
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integrated intelligence effort. All tactical com-
manders and staff officers should employ tech-
nical intelligence in planning and maintaining 
the security of their commands. 
(2) Technical intelligence is that intelli-
gence concerning foreign technological develop-
ments and the performance and operational 
capabilities of foreign materiel, which now or 
may eventually have a practical application for 
military purposes. As with all other intellig-
ence, it is the end product resulting from the 
collection and processing of technical informa-
tion. The scope of technical intelligence is 
broad. It includes all technical aspects of for-
eign equipment, supplies, installations, facili-
ties, communications, and captured or aban-
doned items which have a practical application 
in furthering military operations. The scope 
also includes captured friendly and allied 
equipment and materiel which may have been 
in the hands of a hostile force. Technical intel-
ligence, then, contributes primarily to the ex-
tension of the combat intelligence effort. (See 
appendix B for categories of technical intelli-
gence.) 
1-4. Scientific and Technical Intelligence 
a. Scientific and Technical (S&T) Intelli-
gence includes that foreign intelligence relating 
to basic and applied research in natural and 
applied sciences and in applied engineering 
techniques. Also included are the scientific and 
technical characteristics, capabilities, and limi-
tations of all foreign military systems, weap-
ons, weapons systems, and other materiel; 
production methods employed in their manu-
facture; and related technology pertaining to 
materiel operation, and logistic support. 
b. Within the Department of the Army, the 
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence 
( ACSI) has general staff responsibility for all 
matters pertaining to intelligence and counter-
intelligence activities. The organizational ele-
ment within ACSI which exercises general 
staff supervision over S&T intelligence activi-
ties of the Army is the Scientific and Technical 
Division, Directorate of Foreign Intelligence. 
This division monitors intelligence produced 
and the intelligence activities involved in this 
production to determine that weapons and 
equipment, scientific, nuclear, chemical, mis-
sile, space, and electronic requirements levied 
on DA production facilities are fulfilled. This 
division also provides DA representation on 
scientific and technical committees and work-
ing groups of the U.S. Intelligence Board 
(USIB). 
Section II. THE STRATEGIC EFFORT 
1-5. Introduction 
a. The objectives of strategic technical intel-
ligence are to-
(1) Determine capabilities, limitations, 
and vulnerabilities of foreign technology, ma-
teriel, facilities, and installations. 
(2) Exploit foreign technologies for the 
benefit of U.S. Forces. 
(3) Assist in the development of effec-
tive countermeasures by providing intelligence 
to the overall military research and develop-
ment effort. 
(4) Provide materiel and information 
upon which to base the training of all armed 
forces personnel. 
b. The overall military technical intelligence 
program is vital to the U.S. strategic/national, 
scientific, and technical intelligence effort. The 
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technical intelligence organization of the De-
partment of Defense (DOD) includes elements 
of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and 
the three services or military departments: 
Department of the Army, Department of the 
Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. 
1--6. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
a. DIA coordinates the intelligence activities 
of the three military departments and satisfies 
the intelligence requirements of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and DOD. In the area of techni-
cal intelligence, DIA is responsible for the 
overall management and review of all technical 
intelligence activities throughout DOD. 
b. The action element of DIA for its techni-
cal intelligence responsibility is the Directorate 
of Scientific and Technical Intelligence. Direct 
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communication or coordination is authorized 
between this directorate and the external 
technical intelligence agencies on nonpolicy 
matters relating to the production of S&T in-
telligence. The principal producers of technical 
intelligence within DOD are-
(1) Directorate of Scientific and Techni-
cal Intelligence of DIA (DIAST). 
(2) Foreign Science and Technology Cen-
ter (FSTC) of the U.S. Army Materiel Com-
mand (USAMC). 
(3) Missile Intelligence Directorate 
(MID) of the Army Missile Command of 
USAMC. 
( 4) Medical Intelligence Office of the 
Office of the Surgeon General of the Army. 
( 5) Scientific and Technical Intelligence 
Center (STIC) of the Department of the Navy. 
(6) Foreign Technology Division (FTD) 
of the Department of Air Force. 
1-7. Strategic Role of DA Agencies 
a. ACSI, DA, with general staff responsibil-
ity for all S&T intelligence activities in the 
Army, performs the following functions: 
(1) Formulates policies and procedures 
which insure that S&T intelligence activities 
of the Army are carrried out in the most 
efficient and,productive manner. 
(2) Supervises the preparation and execu-
tion of the Army S&T intelligence program, in 
coordination with DIA, and provides for its in-
tegration into the DOD Consolidated Intelli-
gence Program (CIP). 
(3) Coordinates requirements for techni-
cal intelligence originated by the DA staff and 
major subordinate commands to insure that 
they are fulfilled. 
b. The U.S. Army Materiel Command 
(USAMC) is responsible for commanding, op-
erating, and managing two major CONUS-
based Army S&T production agencies: the 
Foreign Science and Technology Center 
(FSTC) and the USAMC Missile Intelligence 
Directorate of the Missile Command. USAMC, 
through its subordinate agencies, is responsible 
for providing U.S. strategic planners, the mili-
tary research and development effort, and the 
military S&T effort with timely and appro-
priate technical intelligence with the exception 
of medical S&T intelligence . 
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c. The Surgeon General of the Army is re-
sponsible for commanding, operating, and man-
aging the Medical S&T Branch which is part 
of the Medical Intelligence Office. 
d. The Chief of Engineers has DA staff res-
ponsibility to provide program guidance to 
Army component commands on requirements 
for military geographic intelligence, as out-
lined i~ FM 5-30. Within the Corps of Engi-
neers, the U.S. Army Topographic Command 
(USATOPOCOM) is the primary element that 
deals with national level, strategic intelligence. 
e. The U.S. Army Security Agency 
(USASA) is responsible for the exploitation of 
cryptologic and other materiel in support of its 
assigned mission areas as outlined in AR 
10-122 and FM 32-10. 
f. Oversea commands are responsible for col-
lecting and producing S&T intelligence within 
their capabilities and in accordance with vali-
dated DIA requirements, and for exploiting 
and evacuating materiel to CONUS as appro-
priate. Reference AR 755-26 and AR 381-9. 
1-8. S·trategic Procedures 
a. A requirement for technical intelligence 
may be originated by any agency or consumer 
within the Army. Frequently, however, a re-
search and development (R&D) activity or 
major CONUS command may originate this re-
quirement upon military intelligence resources. 
b. Requirements are prepared using DD 
Form 1497 for intelligence production require-
ments (IPR) and forwarded to DIA. Within 
DA, requirements, as reviewed and approved 
by ACSI, are forwarded to DIA for validation 
and tasking. The DIA tasking procedure recog-
nizes the need for direct departmental support 
in order to enable the production agencies to 
provide support to DA and intermediate head-
quarters for quick reaction needs, briefings, 
and special purpose documents. Direct support 
tasks in response to such requirements may be 
levied by the ACSI, DA, on the FSTC, the Mis-
sile Intelligence Directorate, or the Medical In-
telligence Office. The CG, USAMC may levy di-
rect support requirements on FSTC and the 
Missile Intelligence Directorate. The Surgeon 
General may levy direct support requirements 
on the Medical Intelligence Office. The Army 
organization for strategic technical intelli-
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gence is shown in figure 1-1. As requirements 
are satisfied, the information and/or materiel 
are forwarded direct, or through major over-
seas command channels, to CONUS. Unless 
specific instructions to the contrary are given 
by a DA agency, all items for CONUS exploita-
tion will be forwarded to the Commanding 
General, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Com-
mand, ATTN: STEAP-FI, Aberdeen Proving 
Ground, Maryland 21005, in accordance with 
provisions of the theater command. After for-
eign materiel has been received at Aberdeen 
Proving Ground, the decision as to the site of 
actual exploitation of medical materiel is de-
termined by the Surgeon General or his desig-
nated agent. A detailed exploitation plan will 
be furnished ACSI by the agency designated to 
perform the exploitation. 
c. The major DA S&T intelligence produc-
tion effort in CONUS is located at FSTC, Mis-
sile Intelligence Directorate, and the Medical 
Intelligence Office. To consolidate the efforts of 
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these organizations, DIA has established a sys-
tem which standardizes S&T intelligence man-
agement and production procedures for the 
overall DOD S&T intelligence production effort, 
and has assigned certain responsibilities for 
production within DIA and to the military de-
partments. 
d. Final technical intelligence reports are 
disseminated to various consumers in accord-
ance with previously submitted statements of 
intelligence interest (Sii). A continual feed-
back of information from oversea producers to 
DIA and from DIA and CONUS-producing 
units to the oversea major commands is essen-
tial to the effectiveness of the entire technical 
intelligence program. The distribution of tech-
nical information from CONUS-producing 
units is made by DIA to the oversea command 
to insure that military intelligence units are 
kept abreast of important foreign technical 
and scientific trends and developments. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ARMY TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE 
Section I. INTRODUCTION 
2-1. General 
The United States must strive to maintain a po-
sition superior to all enemies and potential ene-
mies in any given area of technology and be 
alert to the future technological developments 
of all nations. In order to obtain this position 
the objectives of technical intelligence are to: 
a. Determine foreign technical materiel 
threats as they affect strategic and tactical 
planners and commanders. 
b. Determine foreign technological capabili-
ties and limitations. 
c. Provide information from which military 
countermeasures are developed . 
d. Provide information which will enable 
U.S. Forces to use foreign materiel and facili-
ties. 
e. Exploit new developments for U.S. mili-
tary needs. 
f. Obtain and exploit items in the DIA Reg-
istry, Foreign Materiel Requirements Listing 
(FMRL). 
g. Provide input on a continuous basis to the 
overall national integrated S&T intelligence 
program in consonance with theater policies. 
h. Provide the technical intelligence aspects 
f~:ir tactical and strategic studies on character-
istics, capabilities, and limitations of foreign 
facilities, equipment, installations, materiel, 
and resources. 
i. Determine efficiency of friendly munitions 
and ordnance. 
2-2. Mission of Tactical Technical Intelli-
gence Units 
a. The mission of Army tactical technical in-
telligence units is to provide assistance to tacti-
cal commanders through the selective examina-
tion, evaluation, and classification of technical 
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information derived from exploitation of for-
eign equipment, materiel and facilities, and 
provide assistance in establishing security 
measures to prevent foreign examination of 
U.S. equipment and information. 
b. Tactical Technical intelligence units/per-
sonnel at all levels perform a twofold mission: 
(1) They advise and assist the com-
mander and staff in meeting tactical planning 
needs in technical areas. 
(2) They assist the strategic S&T intel-
ligence effort by supporting theater DA and 
DOD agencies in the overall integrated techni-
cal intelligence collection and analysis effort. 
(3) They assist with training of units in 
collection procedures. 
(4) They advise units of current technical 
intelligence requirements. 
c. U.S. Army tactical technical intelligence 
units are provided primarily to support the 
field army commander's technical intelligence 
requirements. These military technical intelli-
gence units provide on the spot field analysis, 
detailed analysis, and limited operational data 
from field testing. These units are often in a 
position to make recommendations for exploi-
tation and/or countermeasures. Detailed analy-
sis and evaluation are performed ·by the techni-
cal intelligence company of the field army 
and/or higher echelons. Final and detailed 
technical analysis beyond field army and/or 
theater resources is performed in the appro-
priate CONUS producing unit. 
d. Technical intelligence elements at all 
echelons operate as functionally integrated 
teams to insure maximum coordination, colla-
tion, and exploitation of foreign arms, equip-
ment, and materiel. 
e. Prompt exploitation at the lower echelons 
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provides usable tactical intelligence, assists in 
the production of strategic technical intelli-
gence, facilitates military training, and assists 
the overall national research and development 
effort. 
f. In unified or specified commands, the fac-
tors of distance and processing time from the 
zone of interior may make it desirable for the 
commander's intelligence organizations to per-
form certain functions normally associated 
with CONUS units. In such cases the unified or 
specified commander advises the higher eche-
lon concerned of the functions being per-
formed. He also insures that his action does 
not interrupt the flow of information to the 
higher echelon. Included among these func-
tions may be: 
(1) Publication of technical intelligence 
bulletins. 
(2) Publication of intelligence of a gen-
eral orientation nature. 
(3) Preparation and dissemination of 
other intelligence studies and documents which 
would lose utility if delayed by preparation in 
the zone of interior. 
2-3. T·heater Organization for Technical In-
telligence 
a. The technical intelligence organizational 
concept for theater army is based upon theater 
requirements and the assigned technical intel-
ligence mission. Requirements are generated 
by the technical intelligence needs of the com-
mand and its subordinate elements. The techni-
cal intelligence mission and guidance for its ac-
complishment will normally be provided to the 
theater army commander by the theater com-
mander. Specific tasking as a result of DIA 
validated production requirements will follow 
this same channel. 
b. The theater army G2 will develop a func-
tional organization for his G2 division which 
reflects the usual theater army mission of coor-
dination and supervision of operational, admin-
istrative, and territorial responsibilities. Nor-
mally, the special intelligence branch of the G2 
division includes a S&T section which assists 
the G2 in fulfilling his technical intelligence 
responsibilities. Upon receipt of collection 
directives and other technical intelligence re-
quirements, the theater army G2 publishes spe-
cific directives which are sent through intelli-
gence and technical channels to collection agen-
cies. 
Section II. FIELD ARMY ORGANIZATION FOR TECHNICAL INTELLIGEN·CE 
2-4. Feild Army Echelon 
a. General. The collection of technical infor-
mation and the production and dissemination of 
technical intelligence in the field army area of 
operations require extensive activity coordina-
tion, and continuity of effort. The field army 
G2 is responsible for the direction and staff su-
pervision of the entire technical intelligence ef-
fort within the field army. He is assisted by 
technical intelligence staff personnel organic to 
the field army headquarters which is aug-
mented by a technical intelligence coordinator 
and other technical intelligence personnel from 
the army headquarters support section of the 
Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army. 
These personnel normally constitute a techni-
cal intelligence division or branch within the 
field army G2 section. Staff policy, guidance, 
2-2 
requirements, and directives pertaining to 
technical intelligence collection and production 
are formulated by the technical intelligence 
staff element of the field army G2 section and 
forwarded through MI channels for execution 
by the technical intelligence company. 
b. Technical Intelligence Company. The 
technical intelligence company operates under 
the direct control of the Military Intelligence 
Battalion, Field Army (TOE 30-25E). Figure 
2-1 shows the organization of this military in-
telligence battalion. The Technical Intelligence 
Company (TOE 30-34G) provides for the func-
tionalized execution of the technical intelli-
gence mission, exclusive of collection, within the 
field army. Figure 2-2 shows the organization 
of the technical intelligence company. This 
grouping in one company of various technical 
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skills provides a capability for a coordinated 
technical intelligence effort; an interchange of 
skills, knowledge, and experience; and a con-
solidation of specialized technical skills to in-
sure the varied functional technical intelli-
gence support necessary for the field army. This 
unit is normally located in the vicinity of the 
headquarters of the Field Army Support Com-
mand (F ASCOM). For a detailed discussion of 
the technical intelligence company see FM 
30-9. 
2-5. Corps Echelon 
The duties and functions of the corps G2 tech-
nical intelligence section are similar to those of 
the technical intelligence division or branch of 
the G2, field army (para 2-4a). To augment 
the organic technical intelligence coordinator 
of the corps G2 section, a technical intelligence 
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coordinator and other technical intellil!'ence 
personnel are provided by the attached mili-
tary intelligence detachment supporting the 
corps (TOE 30-18). These are staff coordinat-
ing personnel and normally are not employed 
in as operational role. 
2-6. Augmentation 
Cellular functional technical intelligence teams 
from TOE 30-600 may provide augmentation 
to the military intelligence organization sup-
porting field army, corps, and division a3 re-
quired. These augmentation teams are orga-
nized based on seven collection areas : quarter-
master, signal, chemical, transportation, medi-
cal, engineer, and ordnance. AR 310-10 de-
scribes the procedures for obtaining authoriza-
tion for these augmentation teams. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONALIZATION 
Section I. GENERAL 
3-1. Overall Concept 
The five functional areas of technical intelli-
gence activities are communication-electronic 
intelligence, weapons and munitions intelli-
gence, general supply and equipment (to include 
maintenance) intelligence, mobility intelli-
gence, and medical intell~gence. The proper or-
ganization and employment of the technical in-
telligence specialists in support of these func-
tional areas is critical to mission accomplish-
ment. When employed as functional teams, 
technical analysis and evaluation is accom-
plished more effectively. Personnel must not be 
given analysis tasks which can be more 
efficiently performed by other field army or 
theater assets. Each functionally organized 
technical intelligence team must be tailored to 
perform the required mission. Teams must be 
flexible in their operations since personnel will 
be required to perform extensive coordination 
and liaison internally for mission success. 
Teams should be "tailored" to perform a spe-
cific technical intelligence function with con-
sideration given to the training and capabili-
ties of the tElchnical specialists. The functional-
ized areas of interest of technical specialists 
will frequently overlap. When possible, func-
tional teams should be composed of personnel 
having related functional qualifications. 
Section II. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE 
3-2. Objectives 
-a. The primary objectives of communica-
tions-electronics intelligence are to: 
(1) Provide communication-electronics · 
equipment intelligence concerning the capabili-
ties and limitations of foreign communication 
systems, both civilian and military. 
(2) Provide the field army with intelli-
gence on foreign communications equipment 
and systems. 
(3) Provide -data for possible application 
in developing new U.S. electronic equipment 
and devices. 
(4) Provide communications-electronic 
equipment intelligence for strategic and tacti-
cal planning. 
(5) Assist in providing tactical and stra-
tegic estimates on enemy communication capa-
bilities _to include the complete order of battle 
of enemy units operating in a specified area of 
operation. 
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b. In meeting the above objectives, there is a 
continuous need to examine, analyze, and test 
communications-electronic equipment and de-
vices and to analyze foreign communications 
equipment diagrams, and schematics. Recent 
communication trends and developments neces-
sitate that the scope of communication-elec-
tronic equipment intelligence be broadened to 
include wire, radio, teletypewriter, television, 
satellites, telemetering devices, electronic i-n-
-struments, photography, computers, radar, fac-
simile, and laser communication equipment or 
devices. 
c. Communications-electronics specialists 
maintain extensive liaison with other intelli-
gence elements, particularly those of the U.S. 
Army Security Agency (US ASA). USASA is 
tasked with the mission and responsibility of 
exploiting, on a timely basis, all known or sus-
pected sources possessing possible target ex-
ploitation (TAREX) or other information of 
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USASA interest as outlined in FM 32-10 ancl 
AR 10-122. 
d. In order to properly evaluate and inter-
pret information concerning foreign communi-
cations-electronics research and development, 
and to keep abreast of civilian and industrial 
communications projects, a technical library 
must be established. It should contain commun-
ication and electronics information concerning 
details and performance data on a wide variety 
of items. 
e. Data in the following areas are of pri-
mary interest to communications-electronics 
equipment intelligence production: 
ing. 
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( 1) Radio equirnnenit. 
(a) Output Power. 
( b) Frequency Range. 
( c) Bandwidth. 
(d) Modes of Operation. 
( e) Circuitry design. 
(f) Antennas design. 
(g) Antijamming devices. 
(h) Tube structure. 
( i) Transistors. 
(j) Equipment ruggedness. 
(k) Major modifications. 
(l) Modules. 
( m) Power requirements. 
(2) Telephone equirnnent. 
(a) Types of operation. 
( b) Power requirements. 
(c) Working limits. 
( d) Type signal. 
(3). Switchboards. 
(a) Line capacity. 
( b) Protection. 
( c) Power requirements. 
( d) Cord circuits. 
(e) Types of operations. 
( 4) Teletype equipmenit. 
(a) Method of transmission and receiv-
( b) Type of signal. 
(c) Speed. 
( d) Power requirements. 
( e) Line current. 
(f) Signaling code. 
(5) Facsimile. 
(a) Maximum size of copy. 
( b) Type of recording. 
( c) Drum speed. 
(d) Scanning lines. 
(e) Audio carrier frequency. 
(f) Type modulation. 
(g) Bandwidth. 
(h) Power requirements. 
( 6) Carrier equirnnent. 
(a) Channel capacity. 
( b) Bandwidth. 
(c) Line side operation. 
( d) Loop side operation. 
( e) Transmission media. 
(/) System range. 
(g) Operating levels. 
(h) Signaling frequency. 
( i) Type modulation. 
(j) Power requirements. 
/. Other general areas of interest to com-
munications-electronics equipment intelligence 
are-
(1) Acoustic equipment. 
(2) Missile guidance devices. 
(3) Power equipment. 
(4) Meteorological equipment. 
(5) Electronic countermeasures equip-
ment. 
( 6) Guided missile control systems. 
(7) VT fuse information. 
3-3. Capabilities of. Communications-Elec-
tronics Specialis-ts 
a. Communications-electronics specialists 
are capable of : 
(1) Exploiting intelligence from foreign 
communications materiel. 
(2) Assisting in the exploitation· of for-
eign scientific communications-electronics in-
formation. 
(3) Evaluating enemy communications-
electronics equipment information as received 
on a day-to-day basis. 
(4) Supervising the collection and evac-
uation of enemy communications-electronics 
equipment. 
(5) Coordinating with and providing lim-
ited assistance, as may be required, to other in-
telligence activities such as USASA and strate-
gic intelligence elements. 
(6) Maintaining, evaluating, and inter-
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preting information concerning military and 
civilian research and development. 
(7) Assisting in the exploitation of for-
eign communications complexes and facilities 
by U.S. Forces. This may require communica-
tions-electronics personnel to accompany com-
bat elements whose missions include the cap-
ture of communications bases or targets for 
prompt analysis and exploitation. 
(8) Coordinating with and conducting pe-
riodic briefings to division and higher com-
mand headquarters informing them of the 
equipment being employed by the foreign units 
within their area of operation or adjacent 
areas and the known capabilities and limita-
tion of all enemy communications and electron-
ics units. 
(9) Interrogate all enemy captives or re-
turnees who possess information concerning 
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enemy or foreign communications and electron-
ics equipment or the manner in which it is de-
ployed. 
(10) Process all captured documents deal-
ing with communications and electronics 
equipment to obtain immediate combat techni-
cal intelligence as well as detailed technical 
data. 
b. Signal personnel, in addition to their nor-
mal technical intelligence capabilities, are ca-
pable of: 
(1) Providing recommendations on the 
disposition of fixed and special communications 
installations and/ or equipment. 
(2) Providing limited analysis concerning 
radiac equipment and meters as well as elec-
tronic components of chemical and/or biologi-
cal detection and warning devices and instru-
ments. 
Section Ill. WEAPONS AND MUN-ITIONS INTELLIGENCE 
3-4. Objectives 
The objective of weapons and munitions intel-
ligence is to provide technical intelligence eval-
uation and analysis of: 
a. Free rockets, guided missiles, and asso-
ciated equipment including guidance and 
launching equipment. 
b. Foreign weapons and combat vehicles to 
include tanks, towed and self propelled guns, 
howitzers, and armored personnel carriers. 
c. Nuclear and nonnuclear ammunition, to 
include rocket and warhead sections. 
d. Chemical, biological, and radiological 
weapons and muntions, to include smoke and 
flame weapons and munitions. 
e. Propellants, explosives, and pyrotechnics, 
to include mines. 
f. Demolition techniques, barriers material, 
mine field layouts. 
3-5. Capabilities 
Weapons and munitions specialists have the 
capabilities to: 
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a. Provide technical guidance to corps tech-
nical intelligence collection teams and to evalu-
ate the .technical information received from 
them. 
b. Inspect foreign vehicles and weapons to 
determine modifications and changes. 
c. Identify, examine, and submit reports on 
tactical capabilities of foreign weapons and 
munitions. 
d. Assist in the breakdown and assembly of 
equipment and in the testing of vehicles, equip-
ment, and accessories. 
e. Assist in analysis of parts, assemblies, en-
gines, power trains, and chassis for collation, 
updating, and incorporation of data in techni-
cal manuals and handbooks. 
f. Assist in the production of technical intel-
ligence from factory markings. 
g. Assist in the identification and evaluation 
of flamethrowers, smoke generators, and other 
chemical weapons and munitions. 
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Section IV GENERAL SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT INTELLIGENCE 
3-6. Obiectives 
a. The primary objectives of general supply 
and equipment intelligence are to: 
(1) Provide general supply and equipment 
intelligence on enemy supplies and resources. 
Specific areas of interest are subsistence, indi-
vidual clothing and equipment, general sup-
plies, petroleum, maintenance, and services 
such as graves registration, laundry, and bath. 
(2) Provide the field army with such sup-
ply and equipment intelligence, based on imme-
diate exploitation of materiel and information 
acquired, as may be significant or contributing 
to the immediate tactical mission. 
(3) Provide materiel and information for 
exploitation at theater army or CONUS level. 
b. Technical intelligence analysis of enemy 
combat service support, supply and equipment 
must include consideration of enemy economic 
factors (e.g., food, agriculture, and industrial 
production), the enemy labor force, and enemy 
technological capabilities. In this regard, close 
coordination between technical intelligence and 
strategic intelligence elements at field army is 
imperative. Since analysis of enemy economic 
factors are parts of civil affairs operations, 
changes in their fields are missions normally 
assigned to civil affairs units and staff ele-
ments. 
c. Examination of captured items must be 
continuous and must include consideration of 
the applied sciences which made development 
of the items possible. Increase, decrease, or 
change in a nation's supplies gives indication 
of a change in that country's combat service 
support capabilities. All analyses must be 
made with consideration of the social and cul-
tural environment of the country concerned. 
3-7. Capabilities of Supply, Equipment, and 
Maintenance Specialists 
a. Supply, equipment, and maintenance spe-
cialists have the following capabilities: 
( 1) Determining the design, performance, 
source, and methods of manufacture, and 
methods of storing times. 
(2) Examining supply and maintenance 
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organizations, installations, and storage de-
pots. 
(3) Determining characteristics, limita-
tions, vulnerabilities, and military potential of 
military and civilian facilities. 
(4) Processing and abstracting informa-
tion from foreign commodities and equipment 
acquired in a field army area of responsibility. 
( 5) Preparing technical intelligence re-
ports and studies concerning such items as pe-
troleum, food, clothing, and equipment. 
(6) Assisting in the training of field army 
personnel in supply and equipmePt intelligence. 
(7) Producing and maintaining informa-
tion and intelligence concerning foreign mater-
iel and commodities. 
(8) Assisting in the analysis of foreign 
storage, packing, and preparation of food and 
equipment. 
b. Supply and equipment technical intelli-
gence specialists include highly trained chemi-
cal personnel for operating the CBR agent 
sampling and analyzing kit. Chemical person-
nel evaluate chemical defense equipment, in-
cluding individual and collective protection 
equipment, to include protective clothing and 
decontamination equipment and supplies. 
c. In conjunction with other technical intelli-
gence specialists, supply and equipment special-
ists provide a capability to the field army for 
supervising battlefield collection of a wide va-
riety of items. For example, through the use of 
mobile laboratories available at theater level, 
the analysis, evaluation, and identification of 
captured foreign petroleum products and facil-
ities for U.S. tactical uses are facilitated. 
d. Other areas of technical intelligence to 
which supply and equipment specialists can 
contribute are analysis of : 
(1) Troop subsistence supplies. 
(2) Commodity items. 
(3) Food spoilage and contamination. 
(4) Packaging and marking. 
(5) Data concerning draft animals. 
( 6) Individual and collective protection 
equipment, protective clothing, and decontami-
nation. 
e. Supply and equipment technical intelli-
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gence personnel may assist order of battle sec-
tions by identification of enemy uniforms, in-
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signia, and decorations, and by maintaining 
supply and equipment files. 
Section V. MOBILITY INTELLIGENCE 
3-8. Objectives 
The objectives of mobility technical intelli-
gence cover most aspects of engineer and trans-
portation activity at all echelons of the foreign 
military organizations. Engineer and transpor-
tation support has become increasingly more 
important in all types of military operations. 
Mobility technical 'intelligence specialists will 
usually be involved in both strategic and tacti-
cal technical intelligence. (See FM 30-5 for 
the interrelationship of combat and strategic 
intelligence.) The field army technical intelli-
gence company will have to meet the needs of 
the theater and lower levels. Frequently, the 
same items of mobility intelligence may be 
needed by various levels within the field army 
and the theater. Mobility technical intelligence 
will play an important part in the overall stra-
tegic and tactical planning for field army and 
theater forces. 
3-9. Capabilities 
a. TransportatiOn mobility specialists con-
tribute to the production of technical intelli-
gence concerning foreign air, land, and water 
transportation equipment of immediate or po-
tential military importance. This intelligence 
concerns characteristics, conditions, develop-
ment, organization, materiel, operation, main-
tenance, construction, performance, capabili-
ties, and limiting factors of foreign transporta-
tion equipment and supplies. Mobility technical 
intelligence is necessary for contingency plan-
ning and em~rgency operations. Transporta-
tion specialists will need to produce intelli-
gence on adjacent friendly countries for use by 
technical and strategic planners and combat 
service support elements since U.S. Forces may 
often use another nations's transportation sys-
tem. 
b. Mobility specialists can contribute to the 
following: 
(1) Integration and coordination of the 
transportation collection effort, to include esti-
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mates of capabilities of transportation facili-
ties and systems. 
(.2) Evaluation, interpretation, processing, 
and dissemination of transportation informa-
tion and data to include estimates of capabili-
ties of transportation facilities and systems. 
(3) Assistance in the preparation of 
transportation estimates. 
( 4) Assistance in the interrogation of ci-
vilian and military personnel having transpor-
tation intelligence information. 
(5) Assistance in strategic transportation 
planning. 
(6) Evaluation of new transportation 
modes, systems, and related equipment. 
(7) Assistance in determining an estimate 
of foreign capabilities to transport missiles 
and nuclear weapons. 
(8) Evaluation of economic and technical 
aspects of foreign transportation systems . 
(9) Compilation of data on foreign ~rans­
portation modes, systems, facilities, and equip-
ment. 
c. Engineer mobility specialists contribute to 
limited analyses and evaluation of technical in-
telligence concerning the following : 
(1) Foreign engineer equipment to include 
its capabilities. 
(2) Foreign construction operations, tech-
niques, and resources. 
(3) Materiel quality and shortages. 
(4) Foreign depots, dumps, and supply 
points. 
(5) Water-crossing equipment and tech-
niques. 
(6) Demolition techniques, barrier materi-
als, and mine field layouts. 
(7) A bibliography of foreign military 
and civilian engineer specialists and engineer 
order of battle. 
(8) Studies to evaluate the destructive ca-
pability of nuclear weapons. 
3-5 
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Section VI. MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE 
3-10. Objectives 
a. Medical intelligence is that category of in-
telligence which concerns itself with man as a 
living organism and those factors which affect 
his efficiency, capability, and well-being. Al-
though medical intelligence is a functional en-
tity and should not be fragmented, strategic re-
quirements indicate the need for intelligence 
concerning the relatively broad areas of for-
eign medical technical developments, perform-
ance, and operational capabilities. 
b. Medical technical intelligence is not pri-
marily materiel oriented. Examination, evalua-
tion, and classification of medical materiel are 
only segments of the total medical technical in-
telligence effort. Medical intelligence must re-
tain integrity so that the end product will in-
clude all available information, immediately or 
potentially significant, which affects the health 
and welfare of men and animals in actual or 
potential areas of military operation. Such in-
formation is vital in both strategic and tactical 
planning and may influence military opera-
tions. 
c. The theater command can provide valu-
able assistance and guidance for the field army 
medical technical intelligence effort. The the-
ater surgeon can coordinate the employment of 
medical units in support of medical intelligence 
activities and arrange for support of field army 
medical intelligence activities by theater level 
units as appropriate. The theater surgeon and 
his staff can assist 'the field army G2 in deter-
mining potential tactical and strategic implica-
tions of fully evaluated medical intelligence 
produced by field army technical intelligence 
elements. 
d. The field army surgeon can assist in pro-
viding requirements for medical information/ 
intelligence to the command G2. The intelli-
gence produced may be coordinated and eval-
uated by the field army surgeon and staff as 
necessary. 
3-11. Capabilities 
a. Medical specialists are capable of per-
forming the following specific technical intel-
ligence functions: 
( 1) Collect, examine, classify, and evalu-
ate raw information concerning non-U.S. 
health problems, training, and materiel used 
by foreign medical services. 
(2) Provide medical intelligence informa-
tion to the field army surgeon through G2 for 
professional evaluation prior to dissemination. 
(3) Assist in the interrogation of selected 
prisoners of war, refugees, defectors, and es-
capees to obtain medical information. 
( 4) Assist in the investigation of medical 
aspects of incidents involving diseases or 
enemy CBR operations. 
(5) Accomplish initial examination and 
evacuation of captured foreign medical mater-
iel to include escort of live cultures to CONUS. 
( 6) Assist in the compilation of environ-
mental data pertinent to health aspects of mili-
tary operations. 
(7) Provide technical staff advice on med-
ical intelligence to include the scope of medical 
subjects to be incorporated into medical unit 
training programs. 
(8) Provide limited analysis of drugs, se-
rums, and antibiotics. 
b. Medical information of potential technical 
intelligence value is primarily obtained by: 
( 1) Direct observation of patients and 
medical service operations, both military and 
civilian. 
(2) Discussions with personnel involved 
directly or indirectly with medical service op-
erations (enemy, allied, or civilian). 
(3) Study of military and civilian reports 
and publications of a medical or technical na-
ture. 
( 4) Interrogation or interview of pris-
oners of war, refugees, evacuees, displaced per-
sons, and friendly escapees. 
( 5) Examination of foreign medical ma-
teriel, facilities, and personnel protective de-
vices. 
(6) Coordination with Civil Affairs public 
health teams who obtain information on the 
public health services and facilities in an area 
of operation. 
(7) Review of foreign individual medical 
records, statistics, and health reports to assist 
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in further evaluation of the efficiency of 
friendly materiel used. 
(8) Evaluating foreign capabilities 
through reviewing and interpreting individual 
immunization records and contemplated or ex-
isting preventive medicine programs. (Prophy-
lactic immunizations, drugs, protective drugs, 
clothing, and insect repellents.) 
c. In addition to the above medical technical 
intelligence personnel are able to-
(1) Assist in the identification of CBR 
agents. 
(2) Assist in the evaluation of CBR 
weapons. 
( 3) Provide information and data on med-
ical aspects of enemy combat operations. 
( 4) Assist, as required, in the preparation 
of medical studies and reports of tactical sig-
nificance. 
(5) Collect data regarding foreign mili-
tary and civilian medical facilities. 
(6) Provide advice on communicable dis-
eases. 
d. Special Warfare Capabilities·: 
( 1) Medical intelligence contributes sig-
nificantly to the planning, preparation, and ex-
ecution of activities related to unconventional 
warfare, stability operations, and psychologi-
cal operations by : 
(a) Providing information on the best 
approach to foreign and primitive cultures. 
( b) Recommending the adoption of 
techniques to reduce interpersonal stress devel-
oping in small isolated detachments working in 
a foreign culture. 
(c) Advising the planning staff on the 
medical evaluation of ethnic groups in opera-
tional areas or potential areas of commitment 
concerning those factors which affect their ef- · 
ficiency, capability, and well being. 
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(2) The medical intelligence officer in 
support of guerrilla forces will work closely 
with the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task 
Force (JUWTF). He will assist the J2 in de-
termining medical intelligence requirements, 
establishing EEi and ascertaining which agen-
cies can fulfill the special medical intelligence 
requirements for the support of the guerrilla 
forces. The Medical Intelligence Officer will 
provide information concerning the level of 
medical training suitable to the guerrilla force 
as well as physical and other medical limita-
tions affectinQ' their performance. 
(3) The nature of the enemy and the 
presence of both friendly and hostile civilians, 
in stability operations, place additional re-
quirements upon the command for medical in-
telligence. In addition to determining the re-
ceptivity of the local people to western medical 
practices, medical intelligence can assist in in-
telligence activities involving close coordina-
tion with and participation in civil police type 
operations such as: 
(a) Documentation of civilians (and 
registration). 
( b) Informal interrogations. 
(c) Maintenance of extensive dossiers. 
( d) Medical civic actions. 
( 4) The detailed intelligence required for 
psychological operations often is complemen-
tary to the accomplishment of the medical mis-
sion. Medical personnel are concerned with the 
attitudes of friendly forces, the enemy, and the 
civilian populace as they affect the health, 
medical practices, morale, and the individual's 
well being. This large area of mutual interest 
indicates the need for close coordination and li-
aison between the psychological operations 
personnel and medical intelligence personnel. 
Section VII. CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL (CBR) 
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE 
3-12. Objectives 
The objectives of CBR technical intelligence 
are-
a.. The collection, examination, evaluation, 
identification, and dissemination of informa-
tion on equipment, materiel, and documents 
pertaining to radiological operations and to 
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chemical and biological operations under con-
ditions of nuclear or nonnuclear warfare. 
b. The collection of samples of chemical, bio-
logical, and radiological agents employed 
against friendly forces; the identification of 
chemical agents and/or transmittal of samples 
to a supporting general chemical laboratory 
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for chemical and toxicological analysis; the 
transmittal of biological samples to a support-
ing medical laboratory for microbiological 
analysis; and the collection and forwarding of 
radiological samples to a supporting general 
chemical laboratory for determination of ra-
dioisotopic composition. 
c. The collection, evaluation, and dissemina-
tion of information pertaining to the enemy's 
capability of and techniques and procedures 
for: decontamination, individual and collective 
protection, CBR agent detection and identifica-
tion systems, warning of CBR attacks, impreg-
nation and reimpregnation of clothing, field 
laboratory services, fallout predictions, and ra-
diological monitoring and survey operations. 
d. The .collection and dissemination of infor-
mation on the enemy's capability for chemical 
and biological production, their storage instal-
lations and stockpiles, and tactical operations 
under conditions of nuclear and nonnuclear 
warfare. 
e. Assistance, within the technical intelli-
gence company capabilities, in developing field 
countermeasures against chemical and/or bio-
logical operations under conditions of nuclear 
and nonnuclear warfare and against radiologi-
cal operations. 
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3-13. Capabilities 
Chemical personnel in technical intelligence 
units are capable of providing the following 
assistance : 
a. Examining, evaluating and identifying 
captured CBR materiel. 
b. Examining, evaluating, and identifying, 
when possible, equipment related to CBR oper-
ations. 
c. Preparing and forwarding samples of bio-
logical agents to medical laboratory facilities 
for identification. 
d. Preparing and forwarding samples of 
chemical and radiological agents to the general _ 
chemical laboratory. 
e. Providing technical assistance to staffs at 
army and corps levels on CBR matters. 
f. Maintaining liaison with the theater gen- -
era! chemical laboratory. 
g. Preparing intelligence reports on CBR 
matters and estimates of enemy capabilities 
and intentions for employing CBR agents. 
h. Analyzing and identifying enemy-deliv-
ered chemical agents within the limitations of 
the CBR agent sampling kit and the CBR 
agent analyzing kit. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PLANNING 
4-1. General 
Planning of the collection effort involves basi-
cally the same procedures and considerations 
regardless of the type of information desired 
-combat, strategic, or technical. The collec-
tion of technical information is but one facet of 
the overall collection effort of a command. See 
appendix B for the major categories of techni-
cal intelligence used for planning purposes. 
Planning, a continuing process, involves ini-
tially the establishment of general policies and 
procedures for the collection and production 
effort. Subsequently it involves modification 
and expansion of the plan to support specific 
combat missions and operations of the com-
mand. The key to effective collection of techni-
cal information is the tactical commander and 
his unit; consequently, incorporation of techni-
cal intelligence planning into the planning for 
specific missions or operations of tactical units 
is essential to the production of effective tech-
nical intelligence. Preparation of technical in-
telligence plans is performed by the intelli-
gence officer or staff at each echelon of com-
mand. The technical intelligence unit com-
mander is responsible for internal planning of 
his unit's operations. 
4-2. Initial Planning 
Initial planning will be directed more to the es-
tablishment of policies and procedures for the 
collection and production effort than to the 
specific intelligence requirements of the com-
mand. Initial planning must include provisions 
for-
a. Proper training of members of the com-
mand in recognition, handling, and reporting 
of foreign equipment, materiel, and documents. 
b. Insuring retention in place, if practicable, 
of new or unusual items of captured enemy 
equipment and materiel for initial analysis and 
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exploitation by appropriate technical intelli-
gence personnel. 
c. Safeguarding captured equipment and ma-
teriel against looting, unauthorized destruc-
tion, or retention as souvenirs. 
d. Standardized reporting of captured enemy 
equipment and materiel and dissemination of 
reports to higher and other appropriate head-
quarters. 
e. Insuring availability of technical intelli-
gence personnel, as required, in conjunction 
with specific~missions or combat operations. 
f. Supervision and direction of the evacua-
tion of captured or abandoned enemy equiP-
ment and materiel from collecting points 
through or to the field army area . 
4-3. Planning Procedures 
a. It is imperative that technical intelligence 
management, planning, collection, and produc-
tion procedures be standardized to minimize 
duplication of effort and dissipation of re-
sources. Standardization of planning and re-
porting procedures facilitates production, se-
lection of resources for collection, program-
ming, meeting time schedules, and dissemina-
tion of technical intelligence. 
b. Development of the technical intelligence 
plan involves the following steps: 
( 1) Determination of the technical intel-
ligence requirements based on the mission of 
the command and the requirements of higher 
headquarters. 
(2) Determination of priorities to insure 
efficient utilization of collection resources. 
(3) Balancing of requirements with col-
lection and production capabilities. 
( 4) Selection of appropriate collection 
agencies and issuance of orders and requests 
for specific information. 
(5) Formation of appropriate functional 
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teams to insure maximum equipment and ma-
teriel exploitation. 
( 6) Review of vital technical intelligence 
support areas to determine adequacy of equip-
ment tags, evacuation procedures, provisions 
for establishment of specific collecting points, 
and other administrative and logistical items 
and procedures. 
c. The planning effort is continued by the su-
pervision by the intelligence officer or member 
of his staff over the collection effort to insure 
compliance with orders, monitor incoming in-
formation, and insure that the overall techni-
cal intelligence plan is working effectively. 
d. Technical intelligence planning must in-
clude consideration of technical intelligence 
production, its responsiveness to needs, and the 
cost of the overall production effort. 
4-4. Technical Intelligence Plan 
a. The detailed preparation of the formal 
technical intelligence plan is accomplished by 
the technical intelligence coordinator who is 
attached to the intelligence staff at corps and 
higher levels. He coordinates the plan with 
technical intelligence units and with other gen-
eral and special staff elements. The purpose of 
the plan is to establish procedures for the fol-
lowing: 
( 1) Collection and processing of technical 
information. 
(2) Handling of foreign equipment and 
materiel. 
(3) Dissemination of technical intelli-
gence. 
( 4) Organization for intelligence task 
force operations. 
( 5) Employment of the functional techni-
cal intelligence teams. 
b. A recommended format for the technical 
intelligence plan is contained in appendix C. 
The plan when issued is an appendix to the in-
telligence annex of the operations order. 
c. Supporting technical intelligence plans 
will be prepared at subordinate echelons by the 
appropriate intelligence officers. 
4-5. Technical Intelligence Requirements 
and Priorities 
a. Technical Intelligence Requirementd. 
4-2 
(1) General. The command intelligence 
officer, in coordination with the technical intel-
ligence unit commander, will determine the 
technical intelligence requirements of the com-
mand and the order of priority. Technical in-
telligence requirements serve to focus the at-
tention of intelligence agencies of the com-
mand on the current specific technical informa-
tion needs; they also serve as the basis for or-
ders and requests issued to implement the col-
lection effort. 
(2) Formulation of Requirements. For-
mulation of technical intelligence requirements 
is accomplished in a manner parallel to that of 
the formulation of combat intelligence require-
ments. The following considerations, with oc-
casional modifications, will serve as guides in 
formulation of technical intelligence requir-
ments: 
ti on. 
(a) Enemy technical capabilities. 
( b) Enemy technical vulnerabilities. 
(c) Weather and terrain information. 
(d) Technical order of battle informa-
(e) The next or forthcoming mission or 
operation of the command. 
(f) Prevention of technical surprise to 
the command. 
(g) Technical information needs of 
higher and adjacent headquarters. 
(3) Technical Information Needs of 
Higher Headquarters. Each echelon of com-
mand receives the technical information re-
quirements of the next higher echelons, inte-
grates them with those of the command, incor-
porates them into collection directives, and dis-
seminates the directives to subordinate -eche-
lons for guidance in collection planning. M~ny 
of these requirements originate at DA and 
DOD level and are forwarded in the form of 
collection directives or specific intelligence col-
lection requirements (SICR). 
b. Priorities. Priorities are utilized to direct 
the collection resources of a command toward 
definite objectives in priority of their needs. 
Requirements from higher headquarters will 
include specific priorities. Priorities of the 
local command will be governed by command 
SOP which will guide the intelligence officer in 
assigning priorities to the technical intelli-
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gence requirements. Recurring technical re-
quirements should be programmed in advance 
and priorities changed in accordance with the 
critical dates involved (e.g., to meet recurring 
deadlines for annual studies in specific techni-
cal areas). 
c. Requests for Technical Intelligence. Re-
quests originating withi_n the field army will be 
, forwarded to the appropriate command 
through intelligence channels. Such requests 
must be as specific as possible. If they are 
'based on previous technical and/or combat in-
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telligence reports, such reports must be fully 
identified. Overstatement of requirements must 
be avoided. Requests for technical intelligence 
will follow theater policies. As a minimum, 
they should include the following: 
( 1) Requesting organization. 
(2) Specific requirement. 
(3) Scope of requirement. 
( 4) Reason for requirement. 
( 5) Pertinent data of assistance to techni-
cal intelligence personnel. 
(6) Date desired. 
(7) References (if applicable) . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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CHAPTER 5 
COLLECTION AND COLLECTION AGENCIES 
Section I. INTRODUCTION 
5-1. General 
a. Technical intelligence collection teams are 
dependent almost entirely on other units (par-
ticularly tactical units) for the acquisition of 
foreign equipment, materiel, and documents. 
For this reason frequent liaison and coordina-
tion with all types of units are essential to 
stress the importance of technical intelligence 
requirements, particularly those with high 
priority. Close coordination with intelligence 
personnel operating at lower echelons is par-
ticularly important since their operations 
throughout any area enable them to acquire 
significant technical intelligence information 
and materiel. Most items of technical intelli-
gence interest will be acquired initially by tacti-
cal units in the course of combat operations. 
Tactical or other units may also acquire items 
by discovery in an overrun area, seizure (in 
raids), or requisitioning, purchase, or confisca-
tion (e.g., as by civil affairs units). 
b. The intelligence officer or staff, in develop-
ing the technical intelligence plan, will select 
those collection agencies which can best fulfill 
the needs of technical intelligence. The techni-
cal intelligence company should make frequent 
recommendations to the command intelligence 
officer or staff for inclusion the technical intelli-
gence plan of the company's specific equipment 
and materiel needs as well as requirements for 
essential technical documents, manuals, and 
photographs. When only component elements of 
a piece of equipment are required, identification 
must be sufficiently precise to preclude the un-
necessary collection of the complete item. Col-
lection agencies must be made aware of the po·-
tential value of new or unusual items of oppor-
tunity, i.e., an item not included in require-
ments or wanted lists . 
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c. Many priority technical intelligence collec-
tion requirements generated by programs at 
national and DOD levels will be distributed to 
collection agencies in the form of the Registry, 
Foreign Material Requirements Listing 
(FMRL). Such equipment, when obtained, 
must be evacuated immediately (see chapter 
6). Technical intelligence collection personnel 
at corps must maintain familiarity with this 
list, and tactical units and other collectors 
must receive instructions on the action to be 
taken should such listed items be acquired. 
5-2. Coordination 
a. Frequent coordination between technical 
intelligence elements and all types of units 
within the field army is essential and will fa-
cilitate and supplement the technical informa-
tion collection effort. Necessity for coordina-
tion with tactical units has been mentioned. In-
valuable assistance may be obtained by techni-
cal intelligence personnel through coordination 
·and liaison with such diverse units as air de-
fense, signal, intelligence, Army aviation, and 
general and special staff elements. The advan-
tages of coordination with units of the field 
army support command and its subordinate fa-
cilities should not be overlooked. 
b. Accomplishment of the following coordi-
nation objectives will contribute immeasurably 
to the technical intelligence collection effort: 
( 1) Prompt securing and reporting of for-
eign equipment and materiel by capturing 
units. 
(2) Location and identification of foreign 
items and technical information obtained by 
means other than capture. 
(3) Acquisition of background and collat-
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eral information pertaining to foreign mater-
iel. 
( 4) Maintenance of current knowledge 
(by technical intelligence personnel) on techni-
cal trends and developments. 
(5) Determination of the potential for 
collecting new or any previously unacquired 
items of foreign materiel. 
(6) Orientation of combat, combat sup-
port, and combat service support units and per-
sonnel on their technical intelligence roles, and 
determination of their requirements for techni-
cal intelligence. 
(7) Comparison and exchange of informa-
tion, as authorized, with allied collection and 
technical intelligence agencies, as well as with 
those of other U.S. services and agencies. 
Section II. COLLECT·ION AGENCIES 
5-3. Introduction 
A collection agency for technical intelligence is 
a person, unit, organization, or instrumentality 
which may collect or acquire foreign materiel, 
equipment, or data. Acquisition may be 
through routine collection by troops, research, 
observation, analysis and evaluation, or inter-
rogation. Technical intelligence collection 
agencies include: 
a. Combat troop units (including Special 
Forces operational detachments). 
b. Military intelligence units (e.g., interroga-
tion, counterintelligence, imagery interpreta-
tion, and special collection elements). 
c. Corps technical intelligence teams. 
d. Psychological operations units. 
e. Strategic intelligence elements. 
f. Long range reconnaissance patrol units. 
g. Civil affairs units. 
h. Engineer topographic and terrain units. 
i. USASA units. 
j. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units. 
k. Military Police units. 
l. Combat service support units. 
5-4. Combat Troops 
Units in contact are usually the first to encoun-
ter new or modified foreign materiel and equip-
ment, often with related operating instructions 
or other accompanying technical documents. 
The intelligence officer at each level must in-
sure that captured equipment or documents are 
recovered for technical intelligence exploita-
tion. Vital technical intelligence materiel and 
equipment, particularly new discoveries, 
should not be destroyed prior to technical in-
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telligence exploitation, circumstances permit-
ting. Enemy equipment, materiel, documents, 
and logistical complexes must be promptly safe-
guarded and reported through intelligence 
channels so that the maximum technical data 
may be obtained. This is of special importance 
in the case of documents relating to enemy 
communications-electronics system, e.g., code 
books, call signs, frequency tables, signal oper-
ating instructions (SOI), standing signal in-
structions (SSI), cryptographic data and items, 
and encrypted items. Items, control knobs, and 
switches of communications equipment should 
not be moved until they have been photo-
graphed or their positions recorded. The fore-
going considerations must be included in all 
operational plans and in briefings at each level 
of command. They should be emphasized in 
unit training programs. 
5-5. Military Intelligence Units 
The activities and operations of milita~y intel-
ligence units within the field army result in ac-
cess to or acquisition of numerous technical 
documents, data and items of information on 
foreign equipment and materiel. Military intel-
ligence personnel have frequent contact with 
military and civilian personnel who are excel-
lent sources of technical information. The 
functions of interrogation, counterintelligence, 
and special collection elements result in the ac-
quisition of information of great significance to 
technical intelligence. These elements are re-
sponsive to specific requests for technical infor-
mation. Imagery interpretation elements are 
particularly helpful in establishing collection 
potential and confirming certain aspects of 
technical intelligence. 
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5-6. Corps Technical Intelligence Collection 
Teams 
Technical intelligence collection teams are 
trained in the collection of and search for 
items of technical intelligence interest and re-
lated data and information. Targets of their 
collection and search activities include foreign 
equipment and materiel, facilities, methods, 
techniques, and technical activities. Collection 
teams are available from the field army, Tech-
nical Intelligence Company TOE 30-34, and/or 
the cellular teams available from theater 
army, TOE 30-600. 
5-7. Psychological Operations (PSYOP} 
Units 
Personnel of PSYOP units in support of the-
ater, field army, corps, and division may lend 
assistance in special skills, technical knowl-
edge, and use of such equipment as radios, 
loudspeakers, and printing equipment. The pe-
culiarity of psychological operations indicates 
that specific requirements which such units 
may fulfill are best met by direct coordination 
of technical intelligence personnel with 
PSYOP units. 
5-8. Strategic Intelligence Elements 
The strategic intelligence elements at theater 
and field army, in their research and study ef-
fort, develop information which is of value to 
the overall technical intelligence effort. Such 
elements will be responsive to broad technical 
intelligence requirements, mainly those involv-
ing higher echelons of enemy forces. 
5-9. Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols 
(LRRP) 
The extended depths into enemy area at which 
LRRP operate provide an opportunity for them 
to obtain information on new or previously un-
acquired materiel, locations, estimates of weap-
ons ranges, and other technical data. 
5-10. Civil Affairs Units 
a. The civil affairs organization consists of 
staffs, units, and functional teams. Civil affairs 
units provide command support or area sup-
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port to tactical or administrative units and are 
assigned to support civil affairs operations at 
specific echelons of command or level of gov-
ernment. The size and capabilities of civil af-
fairs units and cellular functional teams may 
vary; however, the personnel assigned to them 
are trained specialists who are technically 
qualified to provide assistance in various spe-
cialized functional areas which are considered 
to be in the normal range of technical intelli-
gence units. These areas include-
( 1) Food and agriculture. 
(2) Public communications. 
(3) Public health. 
( 4) Public transportation. 
(5) Civilian supply. 
(6) Public works and utilities. 
(7) Commerce and industry. 
b. Among potential sources of civil affairs 
units are: 
( 1) Civilian technicians among refugees, 
evacuees, and displaced persons. 
(2) Military personnel with technical 
backgrounds. 
(3) Civilian technicians and scientists as-
sociated with foreign governments or forces. 
( 4) Governmental technical documents, 
specialized libraries, and archives. 
( 5) Industrial and scientific records. 
( 6) Technical blueprints, plans, manuals, 
or other information containing technical in-
telligence in the mobility, communications-elec-
tronics, weapons and munitions, chemical, bio-
logical, and medical fields. 
c. Direct assistance to technical intelligence 
units may be provided by civil affairs units in 
the procurement of technical materiel/equip-
ment, identification of foreign technical person-
nel, and recruitment or hiring of civilian tech-
nicians, scientists, professional people, and 
skilled craftsmen and laborers. Civil affairs 
personnel may procure-
( I) Civilian equipment. 
(2) Medical instruments, drugs, and other 
medical supplies. 
( 3) Civilian motor vehicles, construction 
equipment, and materials. 
( 4) Fuels, lubricants, greases, and propel-
lants . 
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5-11. Engineer Topographic and Terrain 
Units 
Engineer topographic and terrain units are 
designated the responsibility for the collection, 
evaluation, and dissemination of topographic 
information and terrain intelligence. They nor-
mally function at theater, field army, and corps 
levels, with the division engineer having the 
responsibility at division level. Their special 
skills and technical knowledge in the field of 
topography and terrain intelligence relate 
closely to many categories of technical intelli-
gence and may be of assistance in collection 
planning as well as in the analysis and exploi-
tation of foreign materiel and technical docu-
ments. 
5-1·2. USASA Units 
Technical intelligence units must coordinate all 
efforts in the field of communications-electron-
ics intelligence with the appropriate USASA 
units. USASA is tasked with the timely exploi-
tation of all known or suspected sources 
possessing possible target exploitation (TAR-
EX) or other information of USASA interest 
as outlined in FM 32-10 and AR 10-122. 
T AREX personnel are thoroughly conversant 
with USASA technical operations requirements 
and can brief and lend assistance to technical 
intelligence personnel in determining proper 
disposition of materiel of interest to USASA. 
5-13. Explosives Ordnance Disposal {EOD} 
Units 
a. General. Technical intelligence personnel 
should be familiar with EOD activities and 
responsibilities (AR 75-15, AR 75-14) in view 
of the importance of foreign explosive ordnance 
to technical intelligence. The danger of fires 
explosions, burns, and accidental functionin~ 
of explosive ordnance and the possibility that 
abandoned items may be boobytrapped dictate 
the need for assistance of EOD personnel to 
disarm or evacuate such items. FM 9-6 dis-
cusses the recovery and evacuation of ammuni-
tion. FM 31-45 discusses EOD operations and 
responsibilities in support of technical intelli-
gence. 
b. Foreign Ammunition. Foreign ammuni-
tion is of great value to the intelligence effort. 
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Samples of ammunition are of major value to 
the research and development efforts of the 
Army, and may also have immediate tactical 
significance. Particularly, new or modified 
items of foreign ammunition are of great sig-
nificance. Information on foreign ammunition 
is invaluable to order of battle intelligence; 
evaluation of probable enemy courses of action, 
capabilities, and vulnerabilities; and develop-
ment of countermeasures. Strategic value may 
derive from markings, materials used, or the 
mere fact of existence of a certain item. Of tac-
tical concern is the knowledge of employment, 
effectiveness, and possible countermeasures. 
Ammunition, duds, components, and fragments 
may reveal the type and caliber of enemy sup-
porting weapons. Recovered sabotage or booby-
trap devices may provide valuable indications 
of probable enemy courses of action. Manufac-
turing methods and details of design are valu-
able to research and development agencies of 
the Army. Information of the following items 
is of value: 
(1) New items of enemy explosive ord-
nance with complete technical data on con-
struction, markings, and functioning. 
(2) Design or changes in design of known 
explosive ordnance. 
(3) Changes in manufacturing techniques. 
( 4) Quality and type of material and ex-
plosive content. 
(5) Packing, storage, and maintenance 
techniques. 
( 6) Place and date of manufacture. 
(7) All documents relating to the forego-
ing, including sources or potential sources of 
information. 
c. EOD Operations. Close coordination is es-
sential since technical intelligence personnel 
must rely on EOD personnel for disposal and 
evacuation of explosive ordnance, and converse-
ly, EOD units are obligated to notify technical 
intelligence personnel of the types and locations 
of new items of foreign materiel and munitions. 
Recovery and evacuation of explosive ordnance 
and related items are discussed in chapter 6. 
d. Reports. All information collected by 
EOD personnel on first-seen foreign explosive 
ordnance must be reported immediately 
through EOD control centers to EOD staff of-
AGO 6869A 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
ficers. At staff level such reports will be placed 
in intelligence channels for distribution to all 
interested levels of command. 
(1) Preliminary Technical Report (PRE-
TECHREP). This report is prepared by EOD 
personnel upon recognition of an item of explo-
sive ordnance as an item of technical intelli-
gence value. It is forwarded by the fastest 
means available to the EOD control unit for 
distribution to intelligence personnel and other 
EOD units. A tentative render safe procedure 
(RSP) (for EOD use only) will be included 
whether it is necessary to render the item safe 
or not. When it is necessary to render the item 
safe, the EOD team should obtain all essential 
information for safe procedure. This report 
alerts technical intelligence teams so that they 
may be dispatched to the site, and provides 
other EOD units with information on new 
items of explosive ordnance. 
(2) Complementary Technical Report 
(COMTECHREP). These reports are prepared 
by technical intelligence teams or in their ab-
sence, and when requested by the G2 or his 
representative, by EOD personnel. This report 
will be as complete and detailed as possible. 
When prepared by EOD personnel, it will be 
forwarded by the fastest means available 
through the EOD control unit to the technical 
intelligence company. 
5-14. Military Police Units 
a. Collection. As collection agencies, military 
police units and personnel, particulary crimi-
nal investigators, are well suited to assist in 
such functions as: 
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( 1) Collecting and reporting items of for-
eign materiel on the FMRL. 
(2) Locating specific technical items of 
equipment. 
(3) Locating personalities and activities 
within a specialized technical field. 
( 4) Reporting items of potential technical 
intelligence value obtained from prisoners of 
war and civilian internees. 
(5) Reporting items of potential value 
confiscated or captured in raids. 
b. Materiel Obtained by Military Police. The 
different items of foreign materiel subject to 
confiscation from prisoners of war include 
arms; ammunition; military equipment (ex-
cept mess equipment, metal helmets, and pro-
tective masks) ; military documents, such as 
military codes and ciphers; pictures and maps 
or sketches of military installations or imple-
ments of war ; and signal devices. All other 
property taken from prisoners is grouped in 
the category of retained or impounded prop-
erty and must be accounted for or ultimately 
returned to the prisoner if the capturing forces 
assume custody . 
c. Marking of PW Materiel. Procedures for 
marking foreign materiel of potential technical 
intelligence value that is taken froJll PW should 
include means of positively identifying the ma-
teriel with the PW. This is necessary because 
prisoners and materiel will often be evacuated 
through separate channels and accurate identi-
fication of the PW will facilitate future loca-
tion. This would also facilitate the identification 
of certain property which must eventually be 
returned to the PW by regulations . 
5-5 
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CHAPTER 6 
RECOVERY AND EVACUATION OF FOREIGN EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS 
(STANAG 2084, SOLOG 94) 
Section I. INTRODUCTION-
6-1. Concept 
a. Within a theater of operations, captured 
items are exploited at predesignated collecting 
points at division, corps, field army, and the-
ater. Technical intelligence collection teams 
are sent forward of the division collecting 
points to examine captured items at or near the 
scene of acquisition and to arrange for evacua-
tion if necessary. Captured items, except Class 
V, can be evacuated directly from the division 
collecting point to the technical intelligence 
company at field army for exploitation. Collect-
ing points for Class V Ordnance should be ei-
ther the conventional or special ammunition 
supply points (to include missiles). Detailed 
information for recovery and evacuation flow 
of Class V Ordnance is contained in FM 9-6. 
FM 31-45 provides EOD services information. 
b. The immediate headquarters of the unit 
finding or acquiring items of foreign equip-
ment, materiel, and related documents is re-
sponsible to obtain and provide prompt disposi-
tion instructions as to whether the items will 
be evacuated through technical intelligence or 
logistics channels, and to assist the acquiring 
unit in safeguarding, recovery, and evacuation 
of the items, as required. Technical intelligence 
elements are responsible to provide prompt in-
structions on the need for and the evacuation 
of foreign items for technical intelligence pur-
poses. They will perform on-site analysis and 
are also responsible to exploit, secure, and 
store all items of foreign materiel while in 
technical channels. 
c. Intelligence officers and staffs at all eche-
lons are responsible to insure that prompt in-
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structions concerning the need for and evacua-
tion of foreign materiel for technical intelli-
gence are provided to the acquiring unit. They 
must coordinate with their logistics counter-
parts concerning the policies and procedures 
governing the recovery and evacuation of for-
eign materiel. They also provide supervision 
over the evacuation of foreign materiel through 
intelligence channels. 
6-2. Disposal and Transfer 
a. Items evacuated through technical intel-
ligence channels will be returned to logistics 
channels when no longer required for technical 
intelligence purposes. Before such transfer, 
however, a technical intelligence element must 
ascertain that there is no further requirement 
from higher echelons or other agencies for the 
item in question. 
b. Foreign air and naval materiel, equip-
ment, and related technical documents will be 
transferred to U.S. Navy or U.S. Air Force 
technical intelligence or logistics channels at 
the lowest practical level. Until transfer, such 
items will remain in Army technical (or logis-
tics) channels, as appropriate. 
c. The acquisition of foreign materiel, in it-
self, will not necessarily vest title in the 
United States. This is true in the case of items 
acquired incident to belligerent or peace-keep-
ing operations (e.g., acquired by capture or 
confiscation) where ownership of foreign 
property (materiel) is regulated by interna-
tional law. Where there is doubt, the matter 
should be referred to the Staff Judge Advocate . 
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Section II. RECOVERY AND EVACUATION OF MATERIEL 
6-3. Collecting Points 
Collecting points are facilities to which aban-
doned or unserviceable U.S. and captured for-
eign materiel is evacuated for classification, 
segregation, and proper disposition. Collecting 
points operate where needed throughout the 
theater of operations. In the field army area, 
one or more collecting points are provided for 
each corps area and for the field army service 
area. These are generally operated by the Col-
lection and Classification Company (TOE 
29-139). In the division areas, collecting points 
are operated by the division maintenance bat-
talion. Evacuation flow through the collecting 
points is shown in Figure 6-1. Detailed infor-
mation on recovery and evacuation procedures 
is contained in FM 29-22 and 29-30. 
6-4. Equipment and Materiel Recovery 
a. Responsibilities for recovery and evacua-
tion of foreign equipment and materiel at vari-
ous levels are similar to those for U.S. mate-
riel. The discovery of items of foreign materiel, 
however, will be reported by the capturing 
unit through intelligence channels. Items for 
which there are no disposition instructions 
should not be evacuated until coordinated with 
technical intelligence elements. The capturing 
unit must submit a spot report (chapter 7) to 
the int~lligence officer of its higher headquar-
ters. The capturing unit may be directed to 
evacuate the item to the collection and classifi-
cation company or guard it and leave it in place 
for on-site preliminary examination by techni-
cal intelligence personnel. When materiel does 
not have to remain in place for intelligence 
evaluation and the discovering unit is incapable 
of evacuating it, the unit may request evacua-
tion assistance directly from the command re-
sponsible for direct support maintenance. Evac-
uation may be direct from a maintenance col-
lecting point to the technical intelligence com-
pany at field army. 
b. Foreign materiel may be of value for tech-
nical intelligence purposes, or it may be uti-
lized by friendly forces. Foreign materiel 
should be cleared from the battlefield or de-
stroyed to prevent recapture or reclamation by 
6-2 
the enemy or by guerrilla forces. Technical in-
tellige.nce elements of the military intelligence 
battahon and the intelligence officers of all 
commands are interested in captured or aban-
doned items of foreign materiel. Procedures 
must be established for the screening and evac-
uation of materiel. Implementing instructions 
are published by subordinate commands in the 
form of directives and SOP. Jtems of foreign 
materiel being evacuated directly to the field 
army support area are reported through 
higher headquarters to the technical intelli-
gence company and held until disposition in-
structions are provided or responsibility is as-
sumed by the technical intelligence company or 
another activity. Items which are of no use ei-
ther for technical intelligence or for equipping 
friendly forces are demilitarized and disposed 
of as directed by higher headquarters. Only as 
a last resort, however, is medical materiel to be 
destroyed. Captured medical materiel may be 
used to treat PW's and indigenous personnel 
after such supplies have been declared safe by 
U.S. medical authority. 
c. Transportation elements of supported 
units are responsible for transporting foreign 
materiel from collecting points with the assist-
ance of maintenance units as required, based 
on instructions from technical intelligence ele-
ments. 
I 
6-5. On-Site Analysis by Technical Intelli-
gence Collection Tea ms 
a. The objective of on-site analysis (after 
foreign materiel is acquired) is to obtain infor-
mation of immediate tactical value to combat 
forces. Information to be obtained includes the 
following: 
(1) Determination of equipment opera-
tional characteristics, performance, capabili-
ties, and vulnerabilities. 
ons. 
(2) Identification of new significant weap-
(3) Analysis for modifications. 
( 4) Possible countermeasures. 
(5) Identification and proper handling of 
radioactive materiel. 
b. In the event of acquisition of a large num-
ber of like terms of equipment or materiel, the 
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Figure 6-1. Captured equipment evacuation fiow. 
technical intelligence collection teams must ex-
amine the materiel and obtain all available in-
formation relative to lot numbers, date of man-
ufacture, and factory markings that may assist 
in providing information on the item. A suf-
ficient number of items must be evacuated for 
detailed evaluation. The remaining items are 
then processed through normal evacuation 
and/or salvage supply channels. 
6--6. M<C11Tilto11119 <CJrrucdl 'foggo1111g 
a. The capturing unit is responsible for tag-
ging items of foreign materiel. To facilitate 
segregation, collection, analysis, and evacuation 
of materiel for intelligence purposes, weather-
resistant equipment tags, produced locally 
within the theater, are securely attached to the 
item itself and to the shipping container (Fi-
gures 6-2 and 6-3). This responsibility must 
be clearly established by command SOP. 
b. An outgrowth of the capture of foreign 
equipment is the need for an effective "war 
trophy" policy. Care must be taken to insure 
that "items wanted" are not retained as souve-
nirs nor destroyed unnecessarily by the captur-
ing unit. Provisions should be made with the 
host country to insure that all firearms are 
properly registered and conform to existing 
firearm laws. 
c. Equipment tags accompany the materiel to 
its final destination. Article 103, Uniform Code 
of Military Justice, is printed on the reverse 
side of the tag to forestall tampering (Figure 
6-3). 
d. In addition to the establishment of proper 
safeguards, all military personnel should re-
ceive, in conjunction with intelligence training, 
instruction in equipment tagging and in the 
consequences of failure to execute this respon-
sibility. Troops must be indoctrinated not to 
deface original markings on materiel at the 
time of its capture. 
e. Tagging, marking, crating, and prepara-
tion for shipment to CONUS is the major res-
ponsibility of the recovery and shipping sec-
tion of the technical intelligence company in 
accordance with field army and theater pol-
icies. The section must depend upon field army 
support command elements for the preparation 
and shipment of bulky items. 
6-7. IEvacuC1J~ocn Guidall'illi:a 
The general plans, P<?licies, and procedures for 
evacuation of all foreign equipment and mater-
iel are prescribed by the joint/unified/theater 
and field army headquarters. These general 
plans are based upon DA and DOD policies and 
guidance. Each command echelon within the 
field army must insure that its plans are in ac-
cordance with field army directives and the 
overall field army technical intelligence plan. 
6-8. ~ace"a111f all'ild IEvC11«:1Ua!to@1111 ©~ IE:Jt1P>~@so"a 
Ordn<CJll'ilta Cllll'lldl CS~ Mumo!ti@ll'is 
a. The primary interest of technical intelli-
gence units in explosive foreign ordnance has 
been mentioned. However, the assistance of 
EOD personnel in the examination, movement, 
and evacuation of explosive ordnance is man-
datory. First-seen foreign ordnance items 
should be rendered safe by EOD personnel if 
possible. If this is impossible, the item should 
be rendered safe in place by destructive meth-
ods which will minimize damage to the item. 
Complete photographic coverage of the item in 
place, both before and after destructive safing 
should be obtained. Foreign, explosive-type 
chemical or biological ammunition, after being 
rendered safe, is forwarded through technical 
intelligence channels to the general chemical 
laboratory for extraction of samples of the 
agent filling. Extracted chemical agent samples 
-are analyzed by the chemical laboratory, and 
extracted biological agents samples are for-
warded to a medical service laboratory for 
identification. 
b.- Unidentifiable items and those required by 
higher authority should be recovered whenever 
possible, even at considerable risk. Recovery of 
components or fragments of such items may be 
equally important. Recovery is invaluable to 
technical intelligence and to CONUS-based re-
search elements in the development of disposal 
methods and tools. 
c. The following guidelines apply to the re-
covery and evacuation of explosive ordnance: 
(1) New or unknown types of foreign ex-
plosive ordnance recovered by EOD personnel 
must be turned over to technical intelligence 
units for disposition. Security classification of 
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TO BE AFFIXED TO CAPTURED 
ENEMY EQUIPMENT 
DO NOT DISTURB 
NOMENCLATURE: 
SERIAL NO: 
DATE CAPTURED: 
WHERE CAPTURED: 
CAPTURING UNIT: 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE: 
CONDITION: 
NOTICE 
-----
THIS EQUIPMENT IS BEING 
HELD FOR: 
ANALYSIS 
UTILIZATION 
SALVAGE 
DESTRUCTION 
BY AUTHORITY OF JOINT I 
UNIFIED /THEATRE/FIELD 
ARMY COMMANDER: 
(Signature) 
(Unit) 
DO NOT DISTURB 
(DO NOT DISTURB) 
(In language of area of operations) 
Figure 6-2. Equipment marking tag . 
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ARTICLE 103, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTlcE 
a. All persons subject to this code shall secure all public 
property taken from the enemy for the service of the United 
States, and shall give notice and turn over to the proper au-
thority, without delay, all captured or abandoned property in 
their possession, custody or control. 
b. Any person subject to this code who: (1) fails to carry 
out the duties prescribed in subdivision (a) of this article; 
(2) buys, sells, trades, or in any way deals in or disposes of 
captured or abandoned property, whereby he shall receive or 
expect any profit, benefit, or advantage to himself or another 
directly or indirectly connected with him; or (3) engages in 
looting or pillaging; shall be punished as a court-martial may 
direct. 
Figure 6-3. Reverse side of equipment marking tag-Article 103. 
the items and their components will not be 
lower than SECRET. 
Security classification of such items will not be 
lower than SECRET RESTRICTED DAT A. 
(2) Foreign nuclear weapons or compo-
nents, to include sabotage devices, are evacu-
ated through technical intelligence channels. 
( 3) Security and technical escorts are re-
quired to provide safety control for shipments 
of nuclear, chemical, biological, and other haz-
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ardous items of explosive ordnance. Within the 
field army, technical intelligence personnel will 
coordinate with appropriate staffs to establish 
the need and arrange for technical escorts. For 
shipments to CONUS, the theater intelligence 
officer determines the need and arranges for 
technical escorts. 
( 4) Collection of technical intelligence 
data will in many instances entail dismantling 
of the ordnance and stripping of fuzes and 
other dangerous components for analysis and 
evaluation. These operations will be performed 
only by experienced EOD personnel. Disman-
tling and stripping are conducted only in re-
sponse to a specific requirement for such action 
which has been placed through technical intel-
ligence or EOD staffs. 
(5) Captured mines and boobytraps 
should be analyzed or tested only by trained 
weapons/munitions specialists. Extreme cau-
tion must be exercised when taut wire and pull 
releases or similar releases are encountered. 
Unusual mechanisms used as boobytraps 
should be reported immediately by the finding 
unit through intelligence channels to the tech-
FM 30-16 
nical intelligence ~ompany by spot report. 
Countermeasures must be coordinated with 
EOD personnel. Final disposal of explosive 
components or hazardous materials associated 
with such devices and with recovered ammuni-
tion is the responsibility of EOD personnel. 
6-9. Security and Escort 
Many items of foreign materiel acquired by 
U.S. Forces and determined to be of technical 
intelligence value will require safeguarding in 
storage as well as during evacuation. Such 
items may be sensitive due to their criticality 
. or because of a U.S. classification assigned 
(para 6--8 and 7-13). Initially, the finding unit 
is responsible for safeguarding materiel, based 
on instructions from the next higher headquar-
ters, to prevent looting, loss, destruction, or re-
capture by the enemy. Military Police elements 
normally provide physical security at storage 
and during evacuation when foreign materiel 
is sensitive or of special value. Particular at-
tention must be paid to the peculiarities of nu-
clear weapons escort and the technical escort 
requirement for CBR materiel. 
Section Ill. RECOVERY AND EVACUATION OF TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS 
6-10. General 
Doctrine for the handling of captured docu-
ments is contained in FM 30-15, Intelligence 
Interrogation. Technical documents, as they are 
of concern to technical intelligence, are those 
documents usually found with materiel which 
relate to technical design or operation of the 
materiel. Such technical documents may also 
be acquired separately from the equipment or 
materiel they concern (e.g., from prisoners of 
war, from files in overrun areas, found on the 
battlefield). It is essential that technical intel-
ligence personnel coordinate closely with inter-
rogation. elements to facilitate exchange of in-
formation. 
6-11 . Evacuation 
a. Technical documents should be evacuated 
with the materiel to which they concern. If the 
operational situation prevents evacuation of 
the materiel, the documents should be identified 
AGO 6869A 
with the materiel by means of an attached sheet 
marked "TECHDOC" listing the precise loca-
tion, time and circumstances of capture, and a 
description, as detailed as possible, of the ma-
teriel. Adequate and sufficient photographs of 
the equipment should be produced and evacu-
ated with the document. 
b. Documents obtained through liaison with 
interrogation elements should be accompanied 
by a report of pertinent information obtained 
from prisoners of war. 
c. The general guidance in this manual con-
cerning recovery and evacuation of materiel 
pertains also to technical documents. However, 
the diverse nature of documents acquired and 
their frequent interest to various agencies and 
commands dictate the necessity for technical 
intelligence personnel to be familiar with the 
categories of documents and appropriate han-
dling procedures stipulated in FM 30-15 . 
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CHAPTER 7 
PROCESSING, DISSEMINATION, AND USE 
(STANAG 2084, 2097; SOLOG 94) 
Section I. PROCESSING 
7-1. General 
a. The wide range of technical proficiency 
necessary for mission accomplishment will not 
always be found within the technical intelli-
gence collection elements or the technical intel-
ligence company. Assistance from medical, ord-
nance, signal, engineer, and other specialized 
agencies and units will have to be sought. 
Within the technical intelligence company it-
self, a coordinated effort of diverse specialists 
is necessitated by the broad range of the tech-
nical equipment/materiel acquired . 
b. Processing of technical information in-
volves recording, evaluation, and inter.preta-
tion of the collected information. ln urgent sit-
uations technical information can be processed 
as received without waiting to collect support-
ing information, particularly if background 
files and an adequate data base have been es-
tablished and maintained. For example, 
information/intelligence containing data on 
foreign missiles capable of carrying nuclear, 
chemical, or biological warheads, the early use 
of which is a probability, is so urgent that no 
delay between acquisition of the information 
and dissemination can be permitted. 
7-2. Recording 
Technical information and data are recorded in 
journals, workbooks, and technical intelligence 
files to facilitate evaluation and interpretation. 
Recording involves reducing information and 
data to written or graphic form and aids tech-
nical analysts in grouping related items of in-
formation. It expedites the preparation and 
dissemination of technical intelligence reports, 
however, the recording step may be omitted to 
AGO 6869A 
permit rapid evaluation, interpretation, and 
immediate dissemination of urgent tactical in-
formation to the unit(s) concerned. 
7-3. Evaluation 
a. Evaluation includes determining the perti-
nence of the information, the reliability of the 
source and the agency from which the infor-
mation was derived, and the accuracy or credi-
bility of the information. The system of evalu-
ation is described in FM 30-5 and has been 
standardized for use by NATO forces and 
other allies. 
(1) Evaluation involves systematically 
arranging all pieces of information and com-
paring known data with the current state of 
the art, a continuing process at all appropriate 
echelons. As technical information flows to the 
technical intelligence company, it must be asso-
ciated with all related data including previous 
technical reports. 
(2) Technical evaluation must take into 
consideration the industrial and scientific base 
and capabilities of foreign nations. Evaluation 
estimates based solely on U.S. standards must 
be avoided inasmuch as foreign equipment and 
materiel may appear wholly inferior when 
judged only by U.S. standards. 
b. Technical information received from intel-
ligence sources and agencies will consist pri-
marily of reports on the use of new or modified 
items of foreign materiel, the capture of ma-
teriel and documents, and extracts of technical 
information from intelligence reports. These 
reports normally will have been given an eval-
uation by the collecting agency and/or the ap-
propriate intelligence staff. Such evaluations 
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notwithstanding, technical intelligence person-
nel are obligated to re-evaluate each item of in-
formation based on their technical data base 
and technical experience. 
c. Technical evaluation includes the follow-
ing considerations: 
( 1) Does the information concern foreign 
materiel known or suspected to be in use in the 
area of operations? 
(2) Will the information have an immedi-
ate effect on the command mission? 
(3) Is the use of new materiel by the 
enemy indicated, or are increased enemy capa-
bilities indicated? 
( 4) What is the immediate effect cm 
forces in combat? 
(5) Does the information have present or 
future value; if so, to whom? 
7-4. Interpretation 
Interpretation consists of analysis, integration, 
and deduction. It is the mental process of de-
termining the importance of information, inte-
grating this with other technical data, and 
making a deduction as to the value and signifi-
cance of the information. 
a. Analysis. Analysif requires a thorough 
knowledge of foreign equipment and materiel 
to include past technological trends, develop-
ments, and tactical doctrine on equipment use. 
It involves more detailed research as the vol-
ume of technical date increases. Analysis 
within the technical intelligence company is 
centralized in the evaluation and analysis pla-
toon. 
b. Integration. 
(1) Integration is the combining of nu-
merous isolated elements of technical informa-
tion with other technical data to form one or 
more logical conclusions. Technical intelligence 
conclusions are made with primary emphasis 
upon the tactical mission. This phase of inter-
pretation requires judgment, experience, var-
ied background knowledge, and knowledge of 
scientific methods. Formulated technical hy-
potheses (conclusions) should be tested for va-
lidity and reliability. 
(2) The technical intelligence company 
must integrate the technical informaticm pro-
vided by all intelligence collection agencies to 
construct an objective assessment of foreign 
capabilities. 
c. Deduction. Deduction, the last step in in-
terpretation, consists of deriving meaning 
from the hypotheses that have been developed 
and tested. Deduction provides answers as to 
the meaning aml significance of technical intel-
ligence and data in relation to the tactical situ-
ation and area of operation. 
7-5. Processing by Intelligence S·taff 
Sections 
The processing discussed above does not re-
place the normal intelligence processing within 
the G2 staff elements. Technical intelligence is 
integrated with all other intelligence by the G2 
staff and, as one facet of the intelligence prod-
uct, enables the G2 staff to arrive at an esti-
mate of the capabilities, limitations, and future 
courses of action of foreign military forces. It 
is re-emphasized that, as in all steps of techni-
cal intelligence production, close coordination 
between lhe technical intelligence company 
and the organic technical intelligence element 
of the G2 staff is mandatory. 
Section 11. ASPECTS OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION 
7-6. Considerations 
a. The producers of technical intelligence 
must keep in mind that actual and potential 
foreign capabilities, limitations, and probable 
courses of action are under continuous develop-
ment at the field army, theater, and national 
levels. Based upon the technical intelligence 
produced, new requirements for U.S. equip-
ment, doctrine and countermeasures may 
7-2 
evolve. Intelligence that will assist in the prepa-
ration of new U.S. military equipment, doc-
trine, and countermeasures must be considered 
by the technical intelligence producer during 
the entire technical intelligence production 
cycle. 
I>. Factors to be considered by tactical tech-
nical intelligence units and staff officers in-
clude, but are not limited to, the following: 
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(1) Effects of terrain and weather. 
(2) Characteristics, performance, and ef-
fectiveness of foreign equipment and materiel. 
(3) Effectiveness of countermeasures 
against foreign equipment. 
(4) New design features and modifica-
tions of old and/or new equipment. 
( 5) Overall combat intelligence require-
ments. 
7-1·. Technical Reference Library 
a. Technical intelligence processing, re-
search, analysis, and evaluation cannot be con-
ducted without a current data base. The need 
for specific data requirements, performance 
characteristics, equipment descriptions, and 
operational limitations of materiel, and the ex-
tensive need for integration and collation of 
technical information covering wide technical 
areas necessitate the establishment of a techni-
cal intelligence reference library by the techni-
~l intelligence company. As a minimum, the 
technical library should include-
( 1) Technical Bulletins. 
(2) Foreign Equipment Handbooks (by 
country). 
(3) Foreign Materiel Catalog (FOM-
CAT) TB 381-5 series. 
(4) DIA Scientific and Technical Intelli-
gence Registers. 
(5) Organizational and Logistical Data 
Handbooks. 
(6) Enemy tactics and operational con-
cept studies. 
(7) Technical equipment documents and 
studies. 
(8) Order of battle handbooks. 
(9) Foreign Tables of Organization and 
Equipment. 
(10) Foreign materiel exploitation reports. 
(11) Equipment vulnerability studies. 
(12) Threat studies and assessments. 
b. This technical reference library will pro-
vide not only accurate and timely technical in-
formation and intelligence references, but will 
serve to aid interested field army units and 
agencies with limited and specialized technical 
information and thereby reduce the need for 
direct technical support. Selection of library 
references should be based on the needs of 
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combat, combat support, and combat service 
support users and field army requirements. 
7-8. Use of Experts and/or Organizations 
a. The technical intelligence company will 
sometimes require assistance from military 
and/or civilian personnel or organization to as-
sist in the technical analysis of materials to 
fulfill a special tactical or strategic mission. 
This may occur when the expertise needed to 
solve a highly technical and complex problem 
which is· not available within the technical in-
telligence company. Therefore, maintaining an 
up-to-date "Technical Expert File" (of names) 
will prove invaluable. When utilized, these "ex-
perts" should work directly with the technical 
intelligence company, and must possess the 
proper security clearance; they should be used 
as consultants/advisors for a short period of 
time. The most important criterion governing 
the use of these individuals is that such service 
should normally be voluntary. 
b. Experts whose training could be of special 
assistance to technical intelligence units for 
analysis and production services include-
nel. 
nel. 
(1) Ammunition maintenance technicians. 
(2) Guided missile maintenance person-
(3) Nuclear weapons specialists. 
(4) Ammunition supply specialists. 
(5) Data processing personnel. 
( 6) Electronic countermeasures person-
(7) Cryptographic personnel. 
(8) Communications security analysts. 
(9) Optical specialists. 
( 10) Explosive ordnance specialists . 
( 11) Petroleum product analysts. 
( 12) Guided missile propellant and explo-
sive specialists. 
(13) Geographers, geologists, and/or con-
struction specialists. 
(14) Photography experts. 
(15) Communications specialists. 
(16) Weapon systems analysts. 
( 17) Chemists, physicists, and biologists. 
( 18) Radar specialists. 
(19) Indigenous surgeons and medical spe-
cialists . 
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(20) Transportation operations and move-
ments specialists. 
(21) US ASA T AREX personnel. 
7-9. Photography 
a. Photographs, diagrams, and charts (valu-
able sources of permanent information for 
technical analysis and evaluation) are used by 
technical intelligence analysts to supplement 
their finished reports. Photographs of materiel 
acquired in fast-moving tactical situations can 
be sent to the rear by technical intelligence col-
lection teams prior to evacuation of the actual 
equipment. The photograph may be the only 
item available to the analyst if the equipment 
becomes lost, damaged, destroyed, or recap-
tured. Technical intelligence collection teams 
at corps must be cognizant that one of their 
first responsibilities should be to photograph, 
diagram, or sketch in place all items of intel-
ligence value. As many different angles as pos-
sible should be portrayed. 
b. Photographs must be analyzed, evaluated, 
and compared. They should be accompanied by 
appropriate written descriptions to enhance 
their value to the analyst. Skill and training of 
the analyst are essential to maximum exploita-
tion of photographs. All photographs should 
contain a ruler, scale, or other measuring com-
parison to portray relative size of an object. 
c. Long-range reconnaissance patrols, special 
forces operational detachments, and other in-
telligence collection elements may photograph 
special items of technical intelligence interest 
when operating behind enemy lines. Use of 
such units for technical intelligence missions 
must be coordinated at the appropriate eche-
lon, and personnel must be thoroughly briefed 
on technical intelligence requirements prior to 
dispatch. 
Section Ill. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS 
7-10. Reports 
Six types of technical intelligence reports are 
used in technical intelligence collection and 
production. These are-
a. Spot Report. This oral or written report 
(FM 30-5) is prepared by the acquiring units 
and/or intermediate command echelons to re-
port rapidly, by electrical or other means, the 
acquisition of foreign materiel and technical 
documents. Such reports are forwarded 
through intelligence channels to the technical 
intelligence company. Corps may use this re-
port as a basis for dispatch of technical intel-
ligence collection teams if none are in the ac-
quisition area. The basic items of this report 
should include as a minimum: 
( 1) Who is reporting (unit) . 
(2) What is being reported. 
(3) Where and when (coordinates). 
(4) How much materiel. 
( 5) Condition of materiel. 
(6) Whom to contact. 
b. Preliminary Technical Report (PRETE-
CHREP). This report is prepared and trans-
mitted by the quickest possible means through 
intelligence channels on all captured foreign 
materiel. It is prepared by corps technical in-
7-4 
telligence collection teams or the capturing 
unit. The preliminary report contains a gen-
eral description of the equipment and places 
emphasis on alerting tactical units to signifi-
cant technical information of immediate tacti-
cal importance. It is prepared in the format 
shown below : 
(1) Date found, location (map reference). 
(2) Type of equipment and quantity. 
(3) Origin. 
(4) Brief description with distinguishing 
marks. 
( 5) Technical characteristics with an im-
mediate value. 
(6) Name of the commander of capturing 
unit. 
(7) Time and origin of the message. 
(8) Tentative render safe procedure 
(RSP) (for EOD use only). 
c. Complementary Technical Reports (COM-
TECHREP). These reports are prepared by 
technical intelligence collection teams operat-
ing throughout a corps area in support of 
corps elements and supplements information in 
the PRETECHREP. The formats of these re-
ports are given in appendix D. When the situa-
tion does not permit Air Force technical intel-
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ligence teams to arrive at the scene of captures 
or downed enemy aircraft prior to destruction, 
recapture, or loss, Army technical intelligence 
personnel will initially examine and submit 
COMTECHREP Type A. This report will then 
- constitute the only information which can be 
provided to Air Force technical _intelligence. In 
the event items of enemy navy materiel are 
acquired, Type A report format can be modi-
fied for reporting such acquisition. 
d. Detailed Technical Report (DETE-
CHREP). This report is the responsibility of 
the technical intelligence company at field 
army. No format can be specified because of 
the diversity of its content. 
e. Technical Document Report (TECH DOC). 
This report is prepared on all captured enemy 
technical documents such as maintenance hand-
books, operation manuals, drawings, and 
sketches. No format is prescribed. 
f. Special Technical Report. This report is 
· prepared as required by field army G2 staff ele-
ments and higher echelons to provide input to 
studies and plans. It contains special informa-
tion on items of significant intelligence inter-
est. No format is prescribed and content is gov-
erned by the nature of the technical intelli-
gence desired. 
7-11. Nomenclature 
All technical intelligence report nomenclature 
should be, to the extent possible, in consonance 
with overall unified/joint/theater policies and 
guidance. Nomenclature for Soviet Bloc army 
weapons has been NATO-standardized 
(STANAG 2097). Principles of this nomencla-
ture are as follows: 
a. Nomenclature of the country of origin for 
Soviet Bloc army weapons, equipment, and ve-
hicles is used whenever it is known. If un-
known, a short descriptive title will be devised 
and used as an interim measure only. Short in-
terim titles will be issued by higher headquar-
ters (theater, joint, or unified command) as 
soon as possible after sighting details have been 
received. Description titles, as well as interim 
titles, should include the country of design and 
manufacture (when the country of manufac-
ture is different from the country of design) or 
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the best estimate thereof; should include a 
question mark after the country name, when 
appropriate; and should become progressively 
more specific, e.g.: 
( 1) E. German ( ?) Hand Grenade M 
1960. 
(2) E. German copy of Sov Hand Grenade 
M 1960. 
(3) E. German copy of Sov HEAT Hand 
Grenade M 1960. 
(4) E. German copy of Sov HEAT Hand 
Grenade A.KG-3. 
When the manner in which information was 
obtained warrants protection of a confidential 
source or method, the originating (reporting) 
agency will assign an appropriate security 
classification. 
b. Nomenclature for any given piece of 
equipment will include an adequate description 
to show: 
(1) The role of the equipment, e.g., medi-
um tank, howitzer, antitank gun. 
(2) Type of chassis, when applicable (as-
sumed to be wheeled unless otherwise stated), 
e.g., half-tracked, tracked . 
c. The caliber of all weapons will be referred 
to in millimeters and will always be placed im-
mediately preceding the description of the 
weapon. The abbreviation "mm" for millime-
ters will be used. 
d. The year when the equipment was first ,_. 
seen or known to exist will be indicated by use 
of the letter M and the four figures of the year. 
These figures will become a part of the title, 
e.g., 100-mm Field Gun M 1964. 
e. The items to be included in the title of 
each group of weapons and equipment, as weJI 
as examples of these titles are shown in appen-
dix E. 
7-1-2. Report Credibility 
All technical reports produced by the technical 
intelligence company should bear the following 
statement on the cover to give official credence 
to the report: 
This is a United States Army Tech-
nical Intelligence Report. The data 
contained herein was derived through 
limited testing, analysis, and exam-
ination utilizing U.S. Army Labora-
tory and test facilities . 
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7-13. Security Considerations 
a. Classification. Technical reports from the 
technical intelligence company are classified in 
accordance with appropriate Army regulations 
in the 380-series. When equipment is acquired 
through a friendly foreign government, the spe-
cific security classification assigned by that gov-
ernment must be adhered to and given equiva-
lent protection by being assigned to Group 1 
in accordance with AR 380-6. 
b. Security Policies. 
( 1) At times, technical intelligence in-
volves sensitive security equipment/materiel 
and will require stringent security controls by 
the technical intelligence unit. A unit technical 
intelligence SOP on security is mandatory in 
order to provide a security framework ade-
quate to support operational requirements. The 
technical intelligence SOP must be precise, yet 
flexible. The following guidelines are pro·-
vided: 
(a) Requirements for sensitive techni-
cal intelligence materiel in support of assigned 
missions must be carefully planned and should 
be revised periodically. 
(b) Information and materiel should be 
disseminated on a need-to-know basis in ac-
cordance with specific security regulations. 
( c) Care must be taken not to overclas-
sify. 
(2) Indigenous personnel may be utilized 
in some situations. Because of the sensitive na-
ture of many areas of technical intelligence, in-
formation should be released to such personnel 
only after: 
(a) It has been determined that release • 
of the information is in the best interests of 
the United States. 
(b) The security requirements imposed· 
by security regulations and procedures have 
been complied with concerning release of sensi-
tive information. 
(c) Care has been taken to furnish only 
that information for which an explicit need-
to-know has definitely been established. 
(3) Special provisions must be prescribed 
by technical intelligence units for handling all 
captured communications and electronic equip-
ment and documents. This equipment and re-
lated documents must be classified CONFI-
DENTIAL or higher and designated "crypto," 
and tagged and evacuated to the nearest 
USASA element as soon as practicable. Exam-
ples are as follows: 
(a) Speech security devices. 
(b) Teletypewriter security devices. 
(c) Data security devices. 
(d) Off-line encryption devices. 
(e) Document, manuals, circuitry dia- • 
grams, and all ancillary equipment. 
(4) The following items must be classified 
SECRET or higher and evacuated to the near-
est USASA element: 
(a) Key lists. 
( b) Code books and sheets. 
(c) Encrypted messages. 
(d) Signal operating instructions. 
(e) Map coordinate overlays. 
Section IV. DISSEMINATION AND USE 
7-14. Dissemination 
a. Methods. Timely dissemination of techni-
cal intelligence reports is of maximum impor-
tance to· tactical, combat support, and combat 
service support commanders. The methods 
used to disseminate technical intelligence de-
pend upon the detail and urgency of the intel-
ligence and upon the intended users. Primary 
consideration must be given to the needs of the 
tactical users. The spot report, PRETE-
CHREP, and COMTECHREP are used nor-
7-6 
mally for initial reports of acquisition of ma-
teriel and supplementary information. The 
most common means of disseminating pro-
cessed technical intelligence are: 
( 1) Detailed technical reports. 
(2) Technical intelligence bulletins. 
(3) Technical reviews and summaries. 
(4) Special technical reports. 
( 5) Special technical studies and esti-
mates. 
(6) Handbooks. 
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(7) Technical pamphlets. 
(8) Briefings. 
(9) Liaison visits. 
b. Dissemination of Explosive Ordnance In-
formation. Technical intelligence on explosive 
ordnance may be disseminated from any level 
where it originates. Pertinent extracts should 
be provided to EOD personnel at all levels to 
permit development of new EOD tools and ren-
der-safe procedures, as required. EOD control 
units will insure that pertinent information 
contained in PRETECHI!EPS and COMTE-
CHREPS is disseminated to each EOD unit 
under its control and to other EOD control 
units if appropriate. The Foreign Science and 
Technology Center, U.S. Army Materiel Com-
mand, makes available foreign ammunition 
items, reports, and evaluations required for 
study and use in developing EOD tools and 
render-safe procedures. Secrecy of EOD tools 
and render-safe procedures is important to 
prevent the enemy from learning the develop-
ment of effective disarming procedures. 
7-15. Use o~ Technical Intelligence 
a. The user units and agencies are even more 
diverse than the technical fields concerned. It 
is beyond the scope of this manual to specify 
even the general requirements of various units 
and agencies. The requirements for higher 
echelons, intelligence staff sections, and com-
manders have been discussed. All units and 
agencies must familiarize themselves with the 
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capabilities and limitations of technical intel-
ligence, and must insure incorporation of their 
technical intelligence needs into the technical 
intelligence collection and production plans. 
The advantages of coordination and liaison to 
insure receipt of pertinent technical intelli-
gence reports and information cannot be over-
emphasized. Technical intelligence personnel 
of units and intelligence staffs must develop 
familiarization with the technical needs of the 
many different units. It must also be recog-
nized that it is a rare technical item that is of 
interest to only one unit or agency. 
b. Examples of specific technical intelligence 
interests are as follows : 
(1) Military Police units have a continu-
ing interest in foreign physical security devices 
and intrusion detection alarms, traffic control 
devices, police and investigation equipment, 
police record systems, riot control munitions, 
industrial defense equipment, and boobytraps. 
It is obvious that some or all of these items will 
also be of interest to tactical troops, counter-
intelligence elements, civil affairs units, EOD, 
and others. 
(2) Psychological operations units are in-
terested in items of technical intelligence, not 
for their technical intelligence value, but for 
their possible use in psychological operations 
(e.g., defective weapons and ammunition, and 
documents which would tend to discredit the 
enemy) . 
7-7 
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CHAPTER 8 
STABILITY OPERATIONS 
Section I. INTRODUCTION 
8-1. General 
a. The scope of insurgent warfare may en-
compass elite and professionally trained mili-
tary forces as well as local guerrillas or part-
time fighters and noncombatants. There will be 
substantial differences in armament, organiza-
tion, training, equipment, and overall effective-
ness. Technical intelligence collectors and ana-
lysts must take cognizance of these differences 
in their analyses. Familiarity with insurgent 
tactics, doctrine, and organization will greatly 
enhance the technical analysis a~d evaluation 
capabilities of the technical intelligence unit. 
b. Technical intelligence personnel must be 
thoroughly familiar with the characteristics, 
capabilitiE~s, and performance of the small 
arms and weapons originating in many 
friendly and unfriendly nations. The insurgent 
usually has a limited capability to perform 
modifications to weapons and materiel. If these 
modifications are not carefully analyzed and 
evaluated, their significance and the conclu-
sions drawn can be misleading. Technical intel-
ligence derived during stability operations 
often has serious national and political conse-
quences; it must, therefore, be accurate. 
8-2. Special Considerations 
a. Technical intelligence emphasis, goals, and 
priorities in stability operations will differ 
slightly from those in limited and general con-
flict. The basic principles of technical intelli-
gence remain unchanged. However, some proce-
dures may vary and additional considerations 
will be necessary in applying these principles. 
Military units, for example, may be dispersed 
for independent/decentralized operations. 
Movement of technical intelligence personnel 
must be by the fastest means available. Evac-
uation of foreign equipment and materiel 
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must be performed by the most secure means 
available, usually by air, to prevent recapture 
or loss. The insurgent's equipment and mater-
iel normally is less sophisticated in the early 
phases of internal conflict than that of a con-
ventional enemy; their weaponry consists pri-
marily of small arms, automatic weapons, and 
mortars obtained from friendly, neutral, and 
hostile nations. Such equipment is often aug-
mented by primitive, but nevertheless effective, 
weapons such as crossbows, man-traps, and 
sharpened stakes. 
b. Arms caching and weapons smuggling are 
frequently resorted to by the insurgent. Arms 
caches may be of political and tactical signifi-
cance. Arms caches and logistical stores should 
be carefully analyzed and evaluated for techni-
cal intelligence, usually in a combined effort 
with the host country. The discovery of arms 
caches, when carefully exploited by function-
ally integrated technical teams, may lead to 
valuable intelligence about the overall insurgerit 
tactical situation. Normally all captured equip-
ment and materiel becomes the property of the 
host country, and for this reason combined op-
erations, liaison, and coordination are impor-
tant to insure full exploitation. The disposition 
of foreign materiel may be governed by sta-
tus-of-forces or other agreements, thus compli-
cating the collection and analysis problems. As 
in a conventional situation, close coordination 
of technical intelligence personnel with mili-
tary units and all U.S. government depart-
ments and agencies engaged in collection is im-
portant. Combined (U.S.-host country) 
technical intelligence operations are particu-
larly effective in improving the overall collec-
tion capability due to the language ability and 
area knowledge of the host country military 
personnel. 
8-1 
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Section II. RESPONS,IBILITIES 
8-3. Technical lntellignece Emphasis 
a. In stabilit,.v operations, technical intelli-
gence personnel perform the normal duties de-
scribed for conventional operations, but parti-
cular emphasis must be placed on the follow-
ing: 
(1) Training host country combat person-
nel, as necessary, in technical intelligence col-
lection and evacuation procedures. 
(2) Coordinating technical intelligence 
matters with other services having a technical 
intelligence interest and with the host country. 
(3) Assisting in the organization and de-
velopment of a host country technical intelli-
gence capability, if required. 
( 4) Performing increased on-site technical 
intelligence analysis and evniuation of enemy 
equipment and materiel. 
(5) Providing technical advice and assist-
ance to host country military technical intelli-
gence personnel, as required. 
( 6) Assisting in adapting ideas and tech-
niques of insurgents for use by U.S. Forces. 
b. Equally important for the technical intel-
ligence analyst and the intelligence community 
is the ever-present danger of capture of 
friendly weapons and equipment. An examina-
tion of the serial numbers of recaptured weap-
ons will reveal which friendly unit lost the 
item, when, and possibly to whom. The move-
ment of the enemy unit may possibly be traced. 
Coordination throughout the intelligence com-
munity will assist in determining whether the 
item was held by the capturing enemy unit be-
cause of obvious and known needs for the ma-
teriel or whether the item might have been 
transferred to another enemy unit with greater 
need for the specific item. 
8-4. Role of the Unit Intelligence Advisor 
a. The intelligence advisor plays a basic role 
in technical intelligence collection by coordi-
nating host country requests for technical in-
telligence support, providing technical intelli-
gence advice, and informing U.S. intelligence 
staffs when significant discoveries of insurgent 
equipment, materiel, or arms caches are made 
by the unit to which he is attached. Technical 
intelligence collection/analyst personnel mus( 
keep the unit intelligence adviser informed of 
important guerrilla weaponry devek,Jments in 
addition to helping him maintain a technical 
intelligence items wanted list. 
b. Since the unit intelligence advisor is re-
sponsible for advising and training host coun-
try forces in all aspects of intelligence, to in-
clude technical intelligence, a mutual flow of 
technical information between the advisor and 
advisee is highly advantageous. Mutually de-
fined goals and objectives between advisor and 
advisee are essential. 
8-5. Combat Service Support Role 
If and when the insurgency movement pro-
gresses, technical intelligence becomes more 
conventional in its support of tactical opera-
tions. Technical intelligence also assumes its 
normal role in combat service support. The es-
tablishment of a combined U.S. and host coun-
try technical intelligence center may become 
advisable. In this event, the channeling of 
technical intelligence reports and dissemina-
tion of processed technical intelligence should 
be precisely established by SOP. 
Section Ill. PROCEDURES 
8-6. General 
a. Prior to initial commitment of U.S. com-
bat forces, the early detection and identifica-
tion of equipment and materiel used by hostile 
forces assume paramount importance. Identifi-
cation of outside logistical sources of supply is 
imperative and assists in the determination of 
8-2 
diplomatic action, overall strategy, force struc-
ture, and military equipment which should be 
deployed for successful mission accomplish-
ment. 
b. The capabilities and knowledge of U.S. 
Military Attaches, Military Assistance Advis-
ory Groups, or Military Missions present in a 
• 
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foreign country experiencing insurgency can 
supplement the technical intelligence data base 
and facilitate initiation of the U.S. military 
technical intelligence collection and analysis 
effort. 
8-7. Analysis 
a. Technical intelligence collection and anal-
ysis becomes more complicated in stability op-
erations inasmuch as the combined political or 
military objective often is more than merely 
seizing and holding terrain. Information on the 
technical characteristics of insurgent weapons 
must be continuously updated and expanded as 
the weapons or modifications appear. When a 
blockade is used to stop the flow of arms and 
ammunition to the insurgent, technical intel-
ligence analysts must be particularly thorough 
in collection, analysis, and evaluation. For ex-
ample, supply shortages and small changes in 
the chemical composition of propellants and 
demolitions might be indicators of the poten-
tial effectiveness of the blockade. 
b. It is imperative for political/military pur-
poses that technical intelligence personnel keep 
abreast of outside military assistance fur-
nished the insurgent such as modern air de-
fense missiles, guns, propellants, communica-
tions-electronics equipment, and petroleum 
products. For example, analysis of new missile 
propellants may give vital indications of enemy 
tactical capabilities. 
8-8. Investigative Data 
a. The technical intelligence collection teams 
have a responsibility to conduct weapon and 
ammunition cache investigations and make re-
ports thereon. Numerous caches, depots, sal-
vage points, and small factories may be discov-
ered over a period of time and should be ex-
ploited to the extent possible. The weapons and 
ammunition discovered may be a mixture from 
numerous nations, and statistical data must be 
maintained on all weapons, ammunition, and 
supplies captured or found· by U.S. and 
friendly forces. 
b. One of the most important problems fac-
ing technical intelligence specialists will be 
planning for the exploitation of arms caches. 
Priorities must be established with primary 
consideration given to tactical needs. If the 
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number of caches discovered is so great as to 
cause the involvement of all technical intelli-
gence specialists, exploitation of caches will' 
have to be on a selective basis. The entire anal-
ysis effort can be materially assisted by proper 
troop orientation on all aspects of technical in-
telligence, close coordination with major tacti-
cal headquarters, and placement of emphasis 
on the items wanted list. 
c. Tunnels and excavations are frequently 
used by the insurgents to provide protection 
for personnel and supplies and may contain a 
wide variety of potential intelligence inf orma-
tion that should be collected. The following 
checklist should be used by tactical units in 
submitting tunnel information reports: 
(1) Location (coordinates). 
(2) Evaluation of construction. 
(3) Specialized underground areas (class-
room, training) . 
( 4) Installation of communications facili-
ties. 
on) 
(a) Internal to internal. 
( b) Internal to external. 
( c) Use of special antennas. 
(5) Power available. 
(6) Alternate/emergency power system. 
(7) Storage facilities (effect of weather 
(8) Assessment of construction quality of 
internal operational facilities (shops, tool-
making, repairs). 
(9) General assessment of health facili-
ties. 
(a) Waste disposal. 
( b) Water facilities. 
( c) Contamination. 
( d) Care of sick and wounded. 
(e) Assessment of medical standards. 
(10) Assessment of training facilities (if 
applicable). 
(11) Measures taken against severe 
weather. 
(12) Assessment of political propaganda 
indoctrination (documents, news posters, maga-
zines, printing presses). 
(13) Evaluation of use of environmental 
resources. 
(14) Evaluation of local/commercial re-
sources (lumber, cotton). 
(15) Special items of interest. 
( 16) Recreation facilities. 
(17) Assessment of defensive areas. 
(18) Internal security or warning devices. 
(19) Assessment of intelligence or intelli-
gence-related activities. 
(20) New field expedients (of major and 
constant interest). 
(21) Neutralization action (i.e. destroyed, 
partially destroyed, CS gas). 
d. Information on the use of primitive weap-
ons, such as poisonous spikes, crossbows, and 
deadfalls, must be widely disseminated to-
gether with appropriate countermeasures. 
$-9. IL@sios~oic<a1~ Sys~ell'il'il 
Although the logistical system of the insurgent 
may be rudimentary and primitive, the techni-
cal intelligence analysts may be required to deal 
with a variety of commodity items for intelli-
gence purposes (e.g., salt rations, agricultural 
products, primitive drugs, and serums). The 
capability of the insurgent's logistical system 
to support sustained military operations may 
be determined in part through technical analy-
sis of commodity items. 
~-] «ll. CbemlboU'iledl ©1Perr<a1~oel7ils 
a. A major problem of technical intelligence 
is the acquisition of the necessary language 
skills and experience to perform technical 
analysis and evaluation of technical equipment 
in a foreign country. Therefore, combined op-
erations with the host country forces are usu-
ally imperative. Host country military person-
nel who possess some limited technical training 
are used to assist in overcoming language and 
area problems. 
b. Indigenous technical intelligence person-
nel who are thoroughly familiar with the cul-
ture and environment of the insurgent are an 
asset to the analysis, evaluation, and collation 
of certain types of technical data and informa-
tion. For example, the habits of guerrillas liv-
ing in underground tunnels may be useful in 
evaluating and updating important technical 
data. Classrooms, billets, hospitals, and stored 
materiel may be indicators to valuable intelli-
gence. 
c. Civil affairs units may assist in the acqui-
sition of necessary linguistic and technically 
qualified civilian personnel. In stability opera-
tions, civilians having technical knowledge 
may come under civil affairs control, especially 
upon liberation of an area from insurgent con-
trol. Their evacuation for interrogation pur-
poses may not be desirable because of the atti-
tude of the civil population at the time. How-
ever, the civil population may be screened by 
U.S. or host country civil affairs units or police 
elements. When civilians having technical skills 
are identified as possible contributers to techni-
cal intelligence, they should be referred to 
technical intelligence elements. 
8-] ] . S~rroke ©1Perr©1~D©U'ils 
a. An important characteristic of stability 
operations is the extensive use of strike opera-
tions. These offensive operations include recon-
naissance in force, raids, coordinated attacks, 
and search and destroy and search and clear 
operations. Strike operations are terminated by 
withdrawal from the operational area upon 
mission accomplishment; the holding of ter-
rain is not emphasized. 
b. Technical intelligence collection teams 
coordinating with tactical units must emphasize 
to such units that the destruction of potentially 
valuable technical equipment/materiel and fa-
cilities should, when possible, be avoided dur-
ing strike operations. Technical intelligence 
personnel must continually brief tactical ele-
ments on current items wanted lists and other 
items of significant intelligence interest. Proper 
planning, implementation, and dissemination 
of the operations order can minimize the loss 
of potential intelligence in all aspects of stabil-
ity operations. 
~-] '.:l?. ll.@U'ilS)m~©lU'ilS)e ~e~@U'ilU'illtDD$$©117il~e ~©l~li'@~$ 
a. The long-range reconnaissance patrol 
(LRRP) company has a limited capability to 
acquire and exfiltrate small portable items of 
enemy equipment or materiel. Technical intel-
ligence requirements, however, should not in-
terfere with primary patrol missions. 
b. LRRP companies of the corps or their 
equivalent command structure will have an ex-
tensive use for technical intelligence. Special 
technical reports and data should be furnished 
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for special missions. The nature of the LRRP 
mission may necessitate observation, identifi-
cation, and reporting of enemy equipment and 
materiel over a period of 3 to 5 days. Such mis-
sions require as background the most current 
technical information and data. Prior to dis-
patch of the LRRP on certain special missions, 
technical intelligence personnel may be re-
quested to provide a general technical briefing 
on foreign equipment and materiel that will fa-
cilitate accurate identification of enemy equip-
ment and materiel which may be observed or 
used by the enemy to detect such patrols. 
8-13. Psychological Operations 
a. Psychological operations are widely used 
in an insurgency environment. The discovery 
of insurgent propaganda equipment requires 
analysis by a functional team consisting of 
supply, chemical, and equipment personnel to 
analyze the printing presses, chemicals, inks, 
and paper being used. Such analysis is neces-
sary to assess guerrilla methods and determine 
sources of supply. Communications-electronics 
specialists can assist psychological operations 
personnel in the analysis of loudspeakers and 
radio broadcasting equipment. 
b. The technical intelligence aspects of oper-
able foreign radio and television stations and 
printing facilities are important in furthering 
the field army psychological operations capa-
bility. Such installations and facilities should 
be turned over to civil affairs, psychological 
operations units, and communications-elec-
tronic specialists for maximum exploitation. 
c. Radio broadcasting and printing facilities 
can be used to further enhance the overall 
technical intelligence effort. Specific items of 
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equipment desired can be advertised with an 
offer of monetary reward to potential defectees. 
8-14. Boobytraps and Mines 
a. Explosive mines and boobytraps are used 
widely by the insurgent for harassment of mili-
tary operations. It is essential that technical 
intelligence specialists keep abreast of these 
munitions developments. The employment of 
explosive ordnance materiel must be analyzed 
on a continuous basis. For example, duds can 
easily be modified and used as boobytraps. 
b. The weapons and munitions specialists, in 
coordination with EOD personnel, can provide 
the following principal information when such 
weapons and tactics are used : 
( 1) Fragmentation radii. 
(2) Modifications to boobytraps and 
mines. 
(3) Construction of locally manufactured 
mines. 
(4) Principal fuzing systems (pressure, 
pull, chemical). 
(5) Types of munitions (bomb, grenade, 
artillery, mortar) . 
(6) Fuze ingredients and structures. 
(7) Modifications to fuzes. 
(8) The use of "commercial devices" or 
materiel. 
(9) Foreign manufactured items used in 
mines and boobytraps. 
(10) Use of triggering devices (battery or 
blasting machines). 
(11) Use of chemical devices. 
(12) Use of large bombs. 
c. Dissemination of technical intelligence 
concerning boobytraps and mines should in-
clude countermeasures training data. 
8-5 
• 
•i I 
I 
I 
• 
• 
• 
• 
. . 
FM 30-16 
APPENDIX A 
REFERENCES 
A-1-. ARMY REGULATIONS 
(C) 10-122 
75-14 
75-15 
190-60 
310-31 
320-50 
380-series 
381-9 
755-26 
U.S. Army Security Agency (U). 
Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. 
Respom;ibilities and Procedure:-; for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. 
Physical Security Standards for Nuclear Weapons. 
Organization and Equipment Authorization Tables of Organization and 
Equipment. 
Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes. 
Military Security. 
Army Scientific and Technical Intelligence. 
Captured Enemy Equipment and Other Foreign Materiel. 
A-2. ARMY SUBJECT SCHEDULES 
30-46 Technical Intelligence Personnel. 
A-3. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLETS 
310-3 
310-4 
Military Publications Index of Doctrinal Training, and Organizational 
Publications. 
Index of Technical Manuals, Technical Bulletins, Supply Manuals, Supply 
Bulletins, and Lubrication Orders. 
A-4. FIELD MANUALS 
3-1 (Test) 
5-25 
5-30 
5-31 
8-10 
9-6 
9-15 
19-1 
19-4 
19-40 
29-22 
29-30 
30-5 
30-9 
30-10 
30-15 
31-23 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) Combat Service Support, 
TASTA-70. 
Explosives and Demolitions. 
Engineer Intelligence. 
Boobytraps. 
Medical, S~rvice Theater of Operations. 
Ammunition Service in the Theater of Operations. 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit Operations. 
Military Police Support, Army Divisions and Separate Brigades. 
Military Police Support, Theater of Operations (when published). 
Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees. 
Maintenance Battalion and Company Operations (Nondivisional). 
Maintenance Battalion and Company Operations in Divisions and Separate 
Brigades. 
Combat Intelligence. 
Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army. 
Terrain Intelligence. 
Intelligence Interrogation. 
Stability Operations-U.S. Army Doctrine. 
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31-45 
(C) 32-5 
(S) 32-10 
33-1 
33-5 
41-10 
55--8 
100-5 
100-10 
(C) 100-20 
101-5 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Service. 
Signal Security (SIGSEC) (U). 
USASA in Support of a Field Army (U). 
Psychological Operations-U.S. Army Doctrine. 
Psychological Operations-Techniques and Procedures. 
Civil Affairs Operations. 
Transportation Intelligence. 
Operations of Army Forces in the Field. 
Combat Service Support. 
Field Service Regulations-Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) 
(U). 
Staff Officers' Field Manual; Staff Organization and Procedures. 
A-5. TABLES OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT 
A-2 
TOE 30-18 
TOE 30-25 
TOE 30-34 
TOE 30-600 
Military Intelligence Detachment; Corps. 
Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army. 
Military Intelligence Company, Technical Intelligence. 
Military Intelligence Organi:tation. 
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APPENDIX B 
MAJOR CATEGORIES OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE 
Major categories of technical intelligence in-
terest used for planning purposes include : 
1. Science and Technology 
a. Medical sciences. 
b. Physical sciences. 
c. Chemical sciences. 
d. Research and development. 
e. Materials. 
/, Military equipment production. 
g. Missiles and rockets. 
2. Nuclear 
a. Nuclear materials. 
b. Weapons and munitions. 
c. Nuclear reactors. 
d. Nuclear power systems. 
e. Nuclear propulsion . 
3. Communications and Electronics 
a. Radio. 
b. Telephone equipment. 
c. Carrier equipment. 
d. Facsimile equipment. 
e. Radar. 
f. Computers. 
g. Reconnaissance and surveillance equip-
ment. 
h. Electronic countermeasures. 
i. Laser. 
j. Telemetry. 
k. Other. 
4. Chemical and Biological (CB) 
a. CB agents. 
b. Weapons and munitions. 
c. CB defensive equipment. 
(1) Individual and collective protection 
equipment. 
(2) Detection and identification devices. 
(3) Alarms and warning devices. 
( 4) Decontamination equipment. 
(5) Equipment for prophylaxis and 
therapy. 
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5. Ground Combat Systems 
a. 'combat vehicles (wheeled and track). 
b. Support/logistical vehicles. 
c. Artillery. 
d. Air defense equipment. 
e. Infantry weapons. 
f. Ammunition, munitions, fuzes. 
g. Antitank equipment. 
h. ~ndividual equipment and/or supplies. 
i. Special warfare weapons. 
j. Maintenance equipment. 
k. Amphibious equipment. 
l. Camouflage equipment. 
m. Fire support equipment. 
n. Airborne equipment. 
o. Target acquisition equipment. 
p. Construction equipment. 
q. Mine warfare equipment. 
r. Bridging. 
s. Psychological warfare equipment. 
6. Aerodynamic Systems. 
a. Bombers. 
b. Fighters. 
c. Drones. 
d. Helicopters. 
e. Reconnaissance aircraft. 
f. Other. 
7. Missiles. 
a. Aircraft-launched missiles. 
b. Ground-to-ground missiles. 
( 1) Short-range missiles. 
(2) Intermediate range missiles. 
(3) Long-range missiles. 
c. Air defense missiles. 
d. Anti-tank missiles. 
e. Anti-missile missiles. 
I. Space systems. 
g. Submarine/ship-launched missiles. 
8. Sensor Equipment 
a. Optical. 
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b. Acoustic. 
c. Radar. 
d. Photographic. 
e. Electronics, to include telemetry. 
f. Infrared. 
g. Other. 
9. Information Storage and Retrieval. 
a. Electronic data processing equipment. 
b. Document processing equipment. 
c. Manual equipment. 
d. Machine translation equipment. 
B-2 
e. Real-time ADP equipment. 
f. Telemetry support equipment. 
g. Graphic display equipment. 
10. Logistics 
a. Transportation nets, air, rail, water, 
motor, pipeline. 
b. Transport and terminal operations 
equipment. 
c. Terminal facilities, to include beaches. 
d. Cargo container systems. 
• 
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APPENDIX C 
EXAMPLE OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PLAN 
Copy No. 
Thirtieth Army 
HEIMERSHEIN, (595120) Germany 
100930 July 19_ 
Appendix ____ to Annex ____ (Intelligence) to Operation Order. 
1. General 
a. References. 
b. Purpose and scope. 
c. Period covered. 
d. Subordinate elements required to support similar plans. 
e. Priorities. 
2. Organization 
a. Intelligence Agencies (at each echelon). 
(1) Organization. 
(2) Functions . 
(3) Subordinate agencies functions. 
( 4) Supporting agencies. 
(5) Liaison and coordination. 
b. A subparagraph for each functional area of technical intelligence 
as it relates to paragraph 2c. 
(1) Weapons-munitions. 
(2) Communication-electronics. 
(3) Supply and equipment. 
( 4) Chemical. 
( 5) Mobility. 
( 6) Medical. 
c. Each technical intelligence team should know the following: 
(1) Mission. 
(2) General organization. 
(3) Functional team structure. 
( 4) Allotment of technical intelligence personnel. 
(5) Specific functions and responsibilities. 
(6) Location of collecting points at each echelon. 
(7) Availability of chemical and medical laboratories in the 
theater. 
3. Personnel 
a. Military policies concerning: 
(1) Responsibilities of capturing unit. 
(2) Handling captured enemy materiel. 
(CLASSIFICATION) 
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(3) Handling abandoned equipment. 
( 4) Handling technical facilities and installations. 
(5) Authority for destruction of captured materiel when neces-
sary. 
( 6) Taking custody of enemy materiel from capturing units. 
(7) Technical intelligence collection team operations in forward 
area. 
(8) Preliminary examinations and analysis. 
(9) Reports to be rendered. 
(a) To tactical units. 
( b) To technical intelligence company. 
(10) Coordination and liaison with combat intelligence personnel. 
( 11) Equipment evacuation. 
(12) Markings and tags. 
b. Civilian 
(1) Policies concerning civilians in an area of military operations 
having a technical knowledge. 
(2) Limitations on activities of individuals and groups. 
(3) Policies concerning evacuation of civilian personnel. 
( 4) Interrogation of civilians having a technical knowledge. 
4. Direction 
a. Important policies governing overall technical intelligence collec-
tion and analysis (trophies, souvenirs, theater policies). 
b. Amplification of items wanted lists. 
c. Special technical intelligence targets. 
d. Policies governing publishing requirements. 
e. Support to be provided by the field army and its subordinate 
support elements (i.e. F ASCOM, general and direct support ele-
ments). 
f. Additional support requirements necessary and by whom rendered. 
g. Preparing EEi and other intelligence requirements. 
h. Host country agreement (if applicable). 
5. Collections 
a. Documents 
( 1) Procedures for collecting technical documents. 
(2) Forwarding and handling of technical documents. 
(3) Responsibilities for translation of technical documents. 
(4) Responsibilities for analysis, evaluation, and dissemination of 
technical data. 
(5) Handling of timely technical data. 
(6) Channels for forwarding. 
b. Prisoners 
(1) Procedures for selecting personnel with technical knowledge. 
(2) Responsibilities of interrogator personnel. 
(3) Technical intelligence cooperation with interrogators and 
other combat intelligence personnel. 
( 4) Handling of military personnel with technical knowledge. 
(5) Handling of civilian personnel with technical knowledge. 
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(6) Channels for evacuation. 
(7) Ultimate disposition (civilians, defectees). 
(8) Reports to be rendered. 
c. Materiel 
( 1) Specific unit responsibilities. 
(2) Examination policies. 
(3) Evacuation channels. 
(a) Primary. 
(b) Alternate. 
(4) Destruction policies (authority to determine whether a target 
should be destroyed). 
(5) Policies in regard to significant new equipment. 
(6) Sensitive or classified equipment. 
(7) Safeguarding. 
(8) Marking. 
(9) Ultimate disposition. 
d. Facilities and Installations. 
( 1) Procedures for collecting, analyzing, and reporting informa-
tion. 
(2) Areas of primary overall intelligence and technical intelli-
gence interest. 
(3) Channels for forwarding facilities data. 
(4) Disposition and dissemination of facilities data. 
6. Processing 
a. Records and/or files required to be maintained. 
b. General policies governing preparation of technical reports. 
(1) Preliminary reports (PRETECHREPS). 
(2) Detailed technical reports (DETECHREPS). 
c. Liaison and coordination between personnel of the technical in-
telligence company and other intelligence elements concerning 
evaluation and interpretation of technical information. 
7. Dissemination 
a. Scope. 
b. Content. 
c. Editorial assistance. 
d. Types of reports. 
e. Special reports. 
f. Policies governing dissemination. 
8. Functional and Task Force Operations 
a. Theater and/or theater army policies. 
b. Scope and priorities. 
c. Effort that may be expended on missions. 
d. Additional support sources if needed. 
e. Procedures for collecting and reporting data. 
f. Responsibilities for direction of operations. 
g. Limitations on units and individuals. 
h. Security. 
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i. Safeguarding components of intelligence value. 
j. Host country agreement. 
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APPENDIX D 
COMPLEMENTARY TECHNICAL REPORTS (COMTECHREP) 
(STANAG 2084) 
1. COMTECHREP-TYPE A 
To be submitted by the fastest available means immediately following 
initial examination of enemy aircraft. (To be completed to the extent 
possible by Army technical intelligence personnel in event that Air 
Force technical intelligence personnel are not available.) 
A. Date and location of crash and map of reference. 
B. Type of aircraft and: 
( 1) Overall length. 
(2) Overall wing-span. 
C. Identification and distinguishing marks. 
D. Type of engine (s) and condition. 
E. Cause of crash; number, location and caliber of projectile strikes; 
F. 
G. 
H. 
I. 
J. 
condition of aircraft. 
Armament: 
( 1) Guns of all types, installation positions, quantity. 
(2) Ammunition and number of magazines . 
(3) Bombs and bomb installations. 
(4) Mines and mine carriers. 
(5) Rocket projectiles and carriers. 
(6) Pyi:9technics, number and type. 
Armor 'plate; quantity, positions, thickness, strikes, penetrations. 
Number of crew and fate. 
Wings and control surfaces, leading edge protection against balloon 
cables by cutters, strengthening or other special devices; de-icing. 
State if samples are obtainable of: 
( 1) Gasoline. 
(2) Oil. 
( 3) Coolant. 
(4) Hydraulic .fluids. 
(5) De-icing fluids. 
K. Internal equipment; state condition and whether bombsights, 
radio, photographic equipment and electronics equipment and 
instruments are standard. If not, specify modifications, alterna-
tions or omissions. Obtain radio frequency setting, if possible. 
L. Landing gear: type and condition. 
M. General remarks and special points or unusual features not men-
tioned. 
N. Name plates photographed: 
(1) Airframe. 
(2) Engine. 
(3) Others . 
FM 30-16 
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0. Other information. 
P. Name of individual in charge of technical intelligence team making 
examination. 
Q. Time and origin of message. 
2. COMTECHREP-TYPE B 
Used for reporting information about ammunition, missiles, bombs, 
shells, rockets, projectiles, mines, torpedoes, etc., and submitted by the 
fastest available means immediately following initial examination. Only 
those headings for which information is available are reported. 
A. Nationality, designation and mark number. 
B. Description. (Type and category, i.e., tactical missile--cruise). 
C. Overall length of missile, including fuze, tail, vanes, and fittings. 
D. Maximum diameter of missiles/munitions. 
E. Shape and design of missiles/munitions (streamlining shells). 
F. Length and width of tail. 
G. Span of vanes. 
H. Thickness of casing at nose. 
I. Thickness of casing at sides. 
J. Thickness of casing at base. 
K. Material of body. 
L. Material of tail or vanes. 
M. Color and marking of nose. 
N. Color and marking of body. 
0. Color and marking of tail or vanes. 
P. Weight and nature of main filling. 
Q. Total weight of missile/munition. 
R. Method of suspension. 
S. Warhead weight, type, and detonation method. 
T. Fusing systems and markings. 
U. Anti-handling of boobytrap devices. 
V. Method of propulsion. 
W. Date and location of missile/munition. 
X. Other information. 
Y. Name of individual in charge of the technical intelligence team 
making examination. 
Z. Time and origin of message. 
3. COMTECHREP-TYPE C 
To be submitted within 72 hours following the acquisition of an item of 
captured equipment not covered under Types A and B. 
A. Date found, location (map reference). 
B. Type of equipment and quantity. 
C. Origin. 
D. Description with distinguishing marks (additional details). 
E. Conditions of equipment. 
F. Technical characteristics of immediate tactical value (additional 
details). 
G. Recommended disposal. 
H. Name plates photographed. 
I. Photographs taken. 
J. Other information. 
K. Name of chief of team. 
L. Time and origin of message. 
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APPENDIX E 
TITLES OF GROUPS OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT 
(Annex "A" (D of A) to STANAG 2097) 
Type of Equipment 
Small Arms 
Infantry antiaircraft (AA) Weapons 
Infantry antitank (AT) Weapons 
Hand Grenades 
Artillery 
Rocket Launchers 
Tanks 
Armored Personnel Carriers 
Assault Guns (SU's) 
Soft Skinned Vehicles including 
wheeled amphibians 
Engineer Equipment 
Radars 
Missiles 
AGO 6869A 
Items in Title 
Caliber 
Description 
Sighting year 
If antitank (AT) 
Sighting year 
Caliber 
Description 
If Self-propelled (SP) 
Sighting year 
Caliber 
Description 
Number of rounds 
Sighting year 
Weight class 
If amphibious 
Sighting year 
If amphibious 
If tracked or half-tracked 
Sighting year 
Description 
Caliber (without mm) 
Sighting year 
If amphibious 
If tracked 
Description 
Type of drive (wheels) 
Sighting year 
Description 
Sighting year 
Description and Type 
Sighting year 
Role 
Sighting year 
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN-
Examples 
7.62mm Pistol M 1964 
12.7mm AA Machinegun M 7963 
82mm AT Launcher M 1964 
Hand Grenades M 1964 
AT Hand Grenades M 1964 
lOOmm Field Gun M 1964 
152mm SP Gun M 1965 
240mm Rocket Launcher ( 16-round) 
M 1964 
One Round Rocket Launcher M 1964 
Medium Tank M 1964 
Light Amphibious Tank M 1964 
APC M 1964 
Amphibious Tracked APC M 1964 
SU-100 M 1964 
Truck, 4x2 M 1964 
Amphibious Truck, 4x4 M 1965 
Tracked Amphibian M 1964 
Trencher M 1964 
Pontoon M 1964 
Tactical Control SAM Radar M 1964 
Surveillance Field Radar M 1964 
Fire Control Antiaircraft Radar M 
1964 
SSM 1964 
SAM 1964 
(Use STANAG 3236 when applicable) 
E-1 
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